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URANIUM MINING AND MILLING IN VIRGINIA: AN
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY CHOICE
Ronald H. Rosenberg*

The recent discovery of significant quantities of uranium ore in
Pittsylvania County, Virginia has generated interest among mining
companies in mining and milling 1 uranium ore in the state. 2 The
discovery has given rise to considerable concern as to whether uranium mining and milling should be permitted in Virginia and, if
so, how they should be regulated. The prospect of establishing a
new mining industry in the state would not normally attract as
much public attention as has the recent proposal to mine uranium.
However, since uranium is a radioactive material, it has generated
considerable controversy.
Uranium has been mined and milled in parts of the western
United States for over thirty years. However, Virginia could become the first Eastern state to permit uranium production. Since
the eastern United States differs from the West in climate, geological characteristics, and population distribution and density, the social and ecological impacts of uranium production in Virginia are
difficult to predict.
• Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. B.A., 1971, Columbia University; M.R.P., 1974 and J.D., 1975, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The author wishes to recogni2e with gratitude the following research assistants who participated in this project: Gary Parker, Carol Brown, Melanie Donohue, Rolly Chambers,
Will Shewmake, and Barbara Buckley. A special note of thanks is extended to Mrs. Betty
Abele for the preparation of this manuscript. The author would also like to express his
appreciation to the Virginia Environmental Endowment for its financial support of the
project.
' Milling refers to the process by which uranium ore is converted into concentrated uranium oxide or "yellowcake." See text accompanying notes 13-18 infra.
1
In July 1982, Marline Oil Corporation announced the discovery of uranium ore in Pittsylvania County, which it described as "one of the most significant uranium discoveries in
the United States." Marline Oil Corporation, Annual Report to Shareholders 11 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Marline Shareholder Report]. In December 1982, Marline and Union
Carbide Corporation entered into an agreement to evaluate uranium mineralization on some
of Marline's properties within the Swanson Project Area, located about twenty-five miles
north of Danville, Virginia. I d. During 1983, Marline and Union Carbide completed an evaluation of the Project for a Virginia General Assembly study group charged with reviewing
the costs and benefits, including the environmental impacts, of the proposed mining venture. I d. at 13. Marline intended to complete its evaluation of the remaining forty-five thousand acres under lease in Pittsylvania County during 1984 and to plan a series of joint
venture exploration programs on these lands. ld.
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The Virginia General Assembly will be required to decide
whether the risks associated with a uranium mining and milling
industry in Virginia outweigh the benefits to be gained from it. To
develop a state policy on uranium production, the state must assess the potential impacts of uranium mining and milling on
worker safety, public health and the natural environment. Other
Eastern states have approached the issue of uranium mining and
milling with extreme caution, deferring a decision on whether to
license the industry for as many as ten years pending the results of
thorough analysis. 8 The policymakers in Virginia should be no less
careful in assessing the risks presented by the proposed industry.
There are several ways to allocate regulatory responsibility over
the uranium production industry among units of federal, state and
local government. To illustrate the range of choices available to
Virginia, this article will describe the means by which other states
have chosen to regulate uranium mining and milling. This discussion is intended neither to advocate nor to discourage the authorization of uranium production. Instead, it is intended to describe
the legal framework for its regulation that federal and state governments have developed, and to suggest the basis on which Virginia could choose systematically from among the different regulatory schemes.
Section I of the article presents the current state of the domestic
uranium mining and milling industry. First, the techniques of mining and milling are described. Second, the section reviews the potential public health and environmental costs and the potential economic benefits of a Virginia uranium industry.
Section II traces the thirty-eight-year history of federal regulation of the uranium industry. This section highlights the federal
government's shift from exclusive control over nuclear energy and
source material production, toward sharing that authority with the
states.
Section III analyzes the roles that various states have assumed
in the regulation of the uranium recovery industry. This section
examines how the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Agreement
State Program operates in practice, with emphasis on uranium mill
licensing. The advantages and disadvantages of agreement state affiliation are considered. The section identifies four models of state
involvement in the control of the uranium recovery industry; these
• See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
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models indicate the range of choices available to Virginia in formulating its policy on uranium production.
The article will conclude by outlining the possible steps that the
Virginia General Assembly may take in 1985. Virginia starts with a
clean slate. It can exclude the industry altogether, or it can specify
the conditions under which it will authorize mining and milling. In
this sense, the state can mold the industry to the particular needs
of the people of Virginia.
I.

A.

THE URANIUM MINING AND MILLING INDUSTRY

Uranium Mining Techniques

To produce source material for nuclear fuel, uranium must be
removed from its deposit in nature and processed by an operation
called "milling." The end product is uranium oxide (U3 0 8 ), or "yellowcake." Yellowcake is transported to a nuclear enrichment facility for conversion into nuclear fuel pellets that are fabricated into
fuel rods for nuclear power plants.
The initial step toward uranium production is the identification
of sites with a potential for uranium ore recovery. The location,
amount, and concentration of the uranium ore body will determine
if it is worth mining. Surveys conducted by the federal government
have assisted uranium development firms in the discovery of new
ore deposits. In 1974, the Department of Energy initiated the National Uranium Resource Evaluation (NURE) program to provide
accurate uranium survey data by conducting aerial surveys of surface radiation, measuring radioactivity in surface and groundwater,
and performing underground geological examinations. Uraniumproducing companies supplement these data through geological
mapping, geochemical surveying, and subsurface core drilling.
Having decided to mine, the developer must select the mining
technique. The mining industry has developed four techniques for
extracting uranium ore from the surrounding minerals: surface or
open pit mining, underground or deep mining, solution or in situ
mining, and bore hole mining. 4
In open pit mining, the topsoil and rock overburden are removed
from the site and stored at a nearby location. Although surface
• Open pit and underground mining accounted for seventy-five percent of all domestic
uranium ore recovered in 1982. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry 11 (1983) (Table I-12) (Pub. No. GJ0-100) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Statistical Data of
the Uranium Industry].
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mining uranium is essentially the same as surface mining other
minerals, it does require a larger amount of overburden removal. 11
Overburden is transported to a special retention area, where it is
stored until used as backfill material in the final reclamation of the
site. Once the overburden has been removed, the uranium ore body
is excavated by heavy machinery and transported to the mill. Open
pit mining is the preferred method when the ore body is less than
three hundred feet below the surface, but has been employed for
the mining of uranium ore as deep as five hundred feet. 6 ·
When the uranium ore body is more than three hundred feet
below the surface, the high cost of removing overburden usually
requires the use of deep mining techniques. The precise method
for extracting the uranium depends on the shape, size, altitude and
grade of the ore body being mined, the ground stability, and the
cost of extraction. When the ore is in small deposits, inclined entries are made into canyon walls or sloping ground; 7 for larger deposits at a depth of six hundred to fourteen hundred feet, vertical
shafts are dug into the ground. 8 Tunnels are dug from the shafts to
reach the ore deposit.
The ore body is then usually fractured by drilling and blasting
with explosives. Once the ore is removed, tailings9 from the mining
process can be backfilled along the mine walls, if the physical characteristics of the ore body permit. This expedites reclamation of
the mine and reduces the quantity of tailings that must be disposed of at the surface.
Where the low grade of the uranium ore body precludes the use
of conventional mining methods, solution, or in situ, mining may
be used. 10 Inflow wells are drilled into the ore body at a location
upstream of a production weli. An acidic or alkaline leaching solution is injected into the ore body to dissolve the uranium. The solution is pumped to the surface and the uranium extracted. This
circular process of injection and removal is continued until the
• 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on
Uranium Milling B-1 (September 1980) (Pub. No. NUREG-0706) [hereinafter cited as 2
NRC FGEIS].
• Id .
• ld.
8
ld.
• Tailings are the rock and mineral deposits which are removed from their natural environment as waste materials during the mining of uranium and other minerals.
10
In situ or solution mining constituted approximately 11% of uranium production in
1983. 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 11 (Table 1-12).
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level of uranium extracted from the solution is too low to continue
leaching the ore body. The solution mining process eliminates the
risks that conventional mining practices pose to workers and the
large volume of tailings produced by conventional methods. However, it is feasible only where the ore lies in a generally horizontal
bed below the static water table but above an impermeable rock
layer, where the uranium minerals in the ore body are susceptible
to leaching, and where the ore deposit is sufficiently extensive to
justify the higher cost of this method of recovery. 11
A fourth method of uranium extraction is bore hole mining.
Water is sprayed against the ore body with sufficient force to fracture the ore. 12 This method is still experimental and has not yet
been used in the United States.

B.

Uranium .l'vfilling Techniques

After the uranium ore is mined, it is converted by milling into
uranium oxide, U8 0 8 , a dry substance known as "yellowcake." The
conventional milling process produces only one to five pounds of
usable uranium oxide from each ton of ore.
The conventional uranium milling process involves three steps.
First, the uranium ore is blended to obtain uniform physical and
chemical characteristics. 18 Second, the ore is ground in a ball or
rod mill, a water-filled rotating drum containing metal balls or
rods. 14 Finally, the uranium is extracted from the resulting pulp.
Several procedures can be employed, depending on ore composition. Approximately eighty-two percent of current uranium milling
capacity uses an "acid leach" process. 111 When the ore contains
more than twelve percent limestone, an alkaline leaching process is
employed. 16 The leaching process extracts most of the uranium ·
along with impurities. The uranium enriched solution is then separated from the tailings solids.
Where only low grade ore is available, or where the mine site is
far from the mill and the ore body is not extensive, "heap leaching" is sometimes used. Low grade sandstone uranium ores are
" 2 NRC FGEIS, supra note 5, at B-2.
11
Rogers, Golden & Halpern, A Report on Proposed Uranium Mining in Virginia 28
(1982).
11

2 NRC FGEIS, supra note 5, at B-2.
•• /d. at B-4. When solution mining is used, there is no need for the crushing and grinding

steps.
•• /d. at B-5.
•• /d. at B-7.
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placed on a gently sloped, impermeable pad, and saturated from
above with an acidic or alkaline leaching solution. A network of
pipes and drain tiles collects the leachate as it percolates to the
bottom of the ore pile. The leachate is recirculated until the concentration of uranium in the solution is sufficiently high for
extraction.
The solution produced in each of these processes is dewatered in
thickeners and filtered. 17 The "filter cake" is dried to produce the
yellowcake, containing ninety to ninety-eight percent uranium oxide.18 The yellowcake is crushed and screened to the required size
and placed in steel-reinforced drums, which are sealed and stored
for shipping to a uranium enrichment facility. 19
All commercial nuclear power installations in the United States
are light-water reactors that use enriched uranium as the basic
fuel. Uranium occurs naturally as two isotopes- uranium 235 and
uranium 238 - in dramatically unequal amounts. Only 0. 71% of
all uranium is the isotope U-235. 20 The spontaneous fission reaction requires a nuclear fuel containing approximately three percent
U-235. 21 This U-235 concentration is achieved by converting the
uranium oxide into gaseous uranium hexafluoride, UF6 , and diffusing the gas through a porous membrane to gain a U-235-enriched stream. 22 After enrichment, the uranium hexafluoride is
converted into uranium oxide (U02 ) and formed into ceramic pellets for fuel rod fabrication.
C.

Adverse Effects Of Uranium Mining and Milling

Many of the environmental problems created by uranium mining
and milling are common to other extractive industries: (1) disruption of the rural life-style, (2) adverse impact upon vegetation,
wildlife, and aquatic life, (3) aesthetic damage to the rural land.. Jd.
18 /d.

"Id.
•• J. Krenz, Energy: From Opulence to Sufficiency 149 (1980).
•• ld. The fission process for each uranium atom produces a large amount of energy and
approximately 2.5 neutrons. The energy heats a water coolant to produce steam that drives
the turbines of a generator. The liberated neutrons bombard other fissile uranium atoms,
perpetuating the process until the nuclear fuel is fully consumed or a moderator absorbs or
slows down the high-velocity neutrons. ld. at 150-51.
11
J. Duderstadt & C. Kikuchi, Nuclear Power: Technology on Trial 100-02 (1979). The
U.S. Department of Energy operates three gaseous diffusion plants which enrich uranium
for commercial power plants. Other methods of enrichment include gas centrifugation, laser
excitation and electromagnetic separation. Jd. at 101.
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scape and to local historic resources, (4) increase in noise and vibration, (5) pollution of air and water and (6) risks of mine collapse and explosion. Because the ore is radioactive, uranium
production also presents a number of problems not encountered in
the extraction of other minerals.
The primary concern is human exposure to radioactive materials
released in uranium development. Radon-222 gas, a uranium decay
product, must be ventilated from the mine shafts of underground
mines to prevent concentrations hazardous to the miners' health. 23
Non-occupational exposure is also a danger. Residents in the vicinity of the planned uranium mine/mill· complex may be exposed to
radiation through air, groundwater, or surface water
contamination.
The most serious problem, unique to production of radioactive
materials, is that of long-term waste disposal. Since only four to
five pounds of yellowcake is produced from each ton of ore, the
quantity of tailings to be disposed of is tremendous. These radioactive materials and toxic metals must be contained for extremely
long periods of time. The adverse effects of uranium mill tailings
mismanagement became painfully apparent during the late 1960s.
For example, an estimated 300,000 metric tons of radiation-contaminated tailings from uranium mills in Grand Junction, Colorado, had been used as fill material for roads and sewer construction, and as foundations for homes and office buildings. 24 Congress
eventually established a financial assistance program and entered
into a cooperative arrangement with the state of Colorado to decontaminate the Grand Junction tailings. 211 Uranium mill tailings
have been identified in construction fill material at at least six
other sites. 26
Uranium milling operations have also reportedly contaminated
public water supplies and affected river flora and fauna. 27 The
•• 2 NRC FGEIS, supra note 5, at B-1.
.. These tailings, thought to be innocuous, had been donated by the Climax Uranium
Company as a public service. Grammer, The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act
of 1978 and NRC:s Agreement State Program, 13 Nat. Resources L. 469, 478 (1981).
•• 42 U.S.C. § 2017(c) (1982) authorizes the appropriation of funds to clean up contaminated sites.
•• 1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on
Uranium Milling 2-2 (September 1980) (Pub. No. NUREG-0706) [hereinafter cited as 1
NRC FGEIS].
17
See Linker, Beers and Lash, Radioactive Waste: Gaps in the Regulatory System, 56
Denver L.J. 1, 7 (1979) (describing contamination of the Animas River below Durango,
Colorado).
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most severe incident of such contamination occurred in 1979 at
Church Rock, New Mexico, when a mill tailings impoundment
burst and contaminated a river below the impoundment. Finding a
safe disposal site and choosing a material effective for long-term
containment of tailings are two difficult problems to resolve before
authorizing uranium mining and milling.

D.

The Uranium Mining and Milling Industry

The fortunes of the domestic uranium industry are best described as cyclical. Following World War II, the quantity of uranium ore received by uranium mills gradually increased, peaking in
1980 at 16.7 million tons per year. 28 At present, the uranium industry is depressed. In 1980, 23,300 tons of uranium oxide were produced from all sources. 29 Annual production fell to 13,400 tons in
1982. 30 This dramatic drop in production is the result of a severely
depressed market for uranium fuel. Since the demand for electricity has fallen significantly, the price of uranium source material
has also decreased. The depressed uranium market is reflected in
decreased uranium ore exploration, mining and milling.

1.

The Current Uranium Market

Exploration activity is an important measure of the health of the
uranium production industry. There are two types of exploration
activity: exploratory drilling, a search for new deposits, and development drilling, determining the size, shape, and grade of a known
deposit. Over the last several years, exploration activity has significantly decreased in both areas. Exploratory drilling declined from
28.95 million drilling feet in 1978 to 4.23 million feet in 1982. 31 Development drilling dropped from 19.15 million feet in 1978 to 1.13
•• 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 7 (Table I-6). The
surge in prosperity of the industry at the time of the Second World War was caused by the
government's procurement program. Government incentives proved so successful that, by
the end of the 1950s, it became apparent that the uranium supply would soon exceed the
AEC's demand. Consequently, the AEC continued its contracting at fixed levels, and gradually "stretched out" its buying until the end of procurement in 1970. This "stretch out" of
uranium procurement gradually reduced the purchase of uranium oxide by the federal government so as to minimize adverse economic consequences to uranium suppliers. See
Groves, Uranium Revisited, 13 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 87, 95-97 (1967); see also 1 NRC
FGEIS, supra note 26, at 2-1 through 2-2.
•• 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 12 (Table I-13).
80
ld.
•• Id. at 55 (Table IX-1).
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million feet in 1982. 82 Even smaller exploration expenditures for
1984 were estimated. 33 Exploration expenditures will not increase
' until producers are confident that the market for uranium will
improve.
Uranium mining has decreased significantly due to depressed
market conditions. In 1981, two hundred fifty-four uranium mines
were in operation, producing 19,600 tons of uranium oxide. 34 In
1982, one hundred ninety-six mines were in operation. 36 The more
than twenty percent reduction in the number of operating mines
reflects the depressed state of the uranium industry.
As the demand for uranium fuel has declined, milling activity
has also fallen. At the beginning of 1981, twenty-two conventional
uranium mills were operating; 38 by the end of 1982, only fourteen
conventional mills were in operation, and these were operating at
only sixty-four percent of capacity. 37 Considering both active and
inactive mills, the uranium milling industry was operating at fortyfive percent capacity during 1982. 38 Many mills are still in operation solely because of long-term, high-priced contracts.

2. Future Uranium Requirements
As noted above, uranium oxide demand has decreased significantly during the past several years. This is due to a reduction in
electricity demand throughout the nation and the reduced attractiveness of nuclear production of electrical energy. Since nuclear
power plants are the primary consumers of uranium fuel, the number of on-line nuclear power plants expected to be in service in the
future is an indication of future uranium demand.
As of December 31, 1982, eighty nuclear reactors were in commercial operation, with a combined generating capacity of sixtyfour gigawatts (GWe). At that time sixty-five facilities were under
construction. Of these sixty-five, forty-six were more than thirty
percent complete. 39 However, there have been no new orders for
•• Id.
•• Estimated expenditures for 1984 exploration were 34 million dollars for 2.9 million feet
of drilling. Id. at 58 (Table IV-4) .
.. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry 18, 20 (1982) (Pub. No.
GJ0-100) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry].
aa 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 11 (Table 1-12).
aa 1982 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 34, at 49.
87
1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 45 (Table VII-3) .
.. ld.
•• ld. at 69, Table XII-9.
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nuclear power plants since 1978. In fact, from 1978 through 1982,
orders for sixty-two nuclear power facilities in the United States
were cancelled. 40 It is difficult to determine how many of the plants
presently under construction will actually be completed or to project the precise capacity of nuclear generating plants at any point
in the future. The most recent Department of Energy forecasts
project U.S. nuclear generating capacity to be eighty-seven GWe in
1985 and 133 GWe in the year 2000. 41
It is difficult to predict the nuclear power capacity that will
come on line in the future, and it is even more difficult to project
future uranium needs. The Department of Energy (DOE) has predicted a rise in domestic demand for uranium oxide from 12,800
tons in 1982 to 28,100 tons in 2000. 42 However, it seems unlikely
that new uranium sources will be necessary, since ore will be available through existing sources in the western states and through
foreign procurement.
The DOE estimates predict a much more modest increase in nuclear power production over the next two decades than was predicted ten years ago. In view of these forecasts, it may seem surprising that the discovery ·of uranium ore deposits has generated
such great interest among mining companies, in particular, Marline
Oil Corporation. However, Marline asserted that it was optimistic
about the investment potential in low cost domestic uranium resources for the following reasons: (1) domestic production of uranium during 1984 was expected to decrease to less than fifty percent of domestic consumption due to a steady depletion . of low
cost, high grade reserves, (2) foreign sources of uranium supply
were unreliable because of economic and political factors, (3) domestic consumption of uranium was expected to increase approximately fifty percent by 1989 as a result of over thirty new reactors
being brought on line over the next three to four years, and (4)
there was little or no new uranium exploration and development
activity currently underway in the United States and, thus, no apparent new domestic sources of supply sufficient to meet expected
increases in demand for uranium. 43

••
••
••
••

ld. at 68, Table XII-8.
ld. at 68, Table XII-7.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Energy Studies Program 2 (1982).
Marline Shareholder Report, supra note 2, at 11-13.
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3. Potential Economic Benefits of a Virginia Uranium Industry
Despite projections of a depressed future for the uranium industry, proponents of mining in Pittsylvania County project significant economic benefits for Virginia."" They assert that the uranium
industry can operate in relative safety and can provide significant
societal benefits. Successful operation of the Marline project would
add an estimated thirty million tons of uranium ore to domestic
supply over a thirteen-year period. This would have a moderating
effect on uranium prices and could reduce dependence on foreign
source material.
Marline has estimated the economic and employment benefits of
uranium production in Pittsylvania County. Mine/mill complex
construction expenses have been estimated at $82.4 million for mill
process and open pit mining equipment, building materials and
supplies, excavation, concrete, electrical equipment, site preparation, and engineering work. Forty-five percent of these expenditures are expected to be made within the Pittsylvania County area,
thereby benefitting the local economy. The work force required for
construction will number 315, and will draw $5.1 million in wages
over an eighteen-month period. During the thirteen-year operational phase, the uranium project is expected to employ 453 persons who will be paid annual wages of $5.9 million (1981 dollars).
Beyond labor costs, the mine/mill proponents project local
spending of $8.8 million for energy, goods, and miscellaneous expenses. Direct tax revenues to Pittsylvania and Halifax Counties
and the city of Danville attributable to the plant have been estimated at $417,000 per year. The state would also benefit from severance taxes on uranium production.

II.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF URANIUM MINING AND MILLING

The element uranium was discovered in 1789; its radioactivity
was not discovered until 1896. Uranium was produced in the
United States during the earlier part of this century as a byproduct of vanadium mining. The discovery in 1938 that bombarding the nucleus of the uranium atom with neutrons yielded
tremendous energy led to the element's most significant
•• The information in this and the following two paragraphs is cited from Marline/
Umetco, Technical Summary and 1984 Supplement with Supporting Technical Memoranda
IV-46·47 (August 1984).
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A.

The 1946 Atomic Energy Act

The Atomic Energy Act of 194646 was the first legislation to deal
with the post-war consequences of nuclear energy. Because the
original application of atomic energy was military, the federal government initially granted itself a monopoly over the nuclear power
industry. Under the Act, the federal government retained the control it had assumed over the nuclear energy industry and conferred
the responsibility of regulating and promoting the industry to a
civilian agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Federal
control over atomic energy was thus complete. 47
Under the Act, the AEC was to administer domestic control over
atomic energy materials48 and carry on research, production, and
development programs. 49 The Commission was also charged with
encouraging and supporting private research and development. &0
Much of the actual work on atomic energy was performed for the
government by private contractors. 111 Nevertheless, the 1946 Act
sought to create a government monopoly in the field of atomic energy. The 1946 Act provided that the federal government would
retain ownership of all fissionable materials 112 and related produc•• The construction of atomic weapons in the World War II era required a supply of
fissionable materials not readily available in the United States. Uranium ore used in constructing American atomic weapons came from deposits in the Belgian Congo and Canada.
To supplement these foreign sources, uranium ore was procured from vanadium mines and
old tailings dumps in Colorado. 1 NRC FGEIS, supra note 26, at 2-1.
•• Pub. L. No. 79-585, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2011-2296 (1982)).
•• During the 1950s there was considerable interest in permitting the state governments
to enter the field of nuclear regulation. A number of commentators wrote in support of
allowing the states to regulate at least some aspect of the atomic energy industry. See Krebs
& Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development, 21 Law & Contemp. Probs.
182 (1956); Parker, The Need for State Atomic Energy Programs in the West, 29 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 296 (1957); Frampton, Radiation Exposure - the Need for a National Policy,
10 Stan. L. Rev. 7 (1957).
•• The 1946 Act § 5(a)-(c).
•• /d. § 3(a); S. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1327, 1329-31.
110
The 1946 Act § 3(a). The conflict between promotional activities and regulatory activities was remedied in 1974 by dividing the AEC into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and the Energy Research and Development Administration.
•• Prior to 1954, 95% of total federal government expenditures on atomic energy were
through private contractors. Parker, supra note 47, at 301. In addition, during this period
there were about 150,000 persons employed in the atomic energy program, of which contractor employees accounted for about 142,000. Id; see also Frampton, supra note 47, at 17.
•• The 1946 Act § 5(a)(2). The Act provided that "fissionable materials means plutonium,
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tion facilities. 63 The Act specifically prohibited private ownership
of fissionable materials without AEC authorization. 64 Although the
1946 Act gave the AEC the power to control the possession and
transfer of source materials, 66 Congress did not extend the governmental monopoly to the ownership of source materials. 66
More importantly, the 1946 Act excluded the power to regulate
uranium and thorium mining from the extensive authority that it
conferred on the federal government. The AEC's licensing and regulatory responsibilities were not to apply to "any source material
prior to removal from its place of deposit in nature."67 The legislative history of the 1946 Act makes it clear that Congress sought to
leave the mining and exploration for uranium ore in the hands of
private enterprise. 68 During the 1950s, the federal government not
only permitted private miners to supply source materials, but also
created incentives to encourage uranium mining. 69 Thus, the early
statutory structure placed uranium mining outside the scope of
federal regulatory control and left it, presumably, to the states.
This regulatory structure is reflected in current federal statutory
and administrative policy. 60

B.

The 1954 Atomic Energy Act
The Atomic Energy Act of 195461 was the culmination of several

uranium enriched in the isotope 235, any other material which the commission determines
to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through a nuclear chain reaction
of the material, or any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing; but does not
include source materials." ld. § 5(a)(l).
•• Id. § 4(c). See generally Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in
the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 Colum. L. Rev.
392, 394 (1976) .
.. Id. § 5(a)(2).
•• Id. § 5(b)(2).
"" ld. § 5(a)(3). Source materials were defined by the 1946 Act to include uranium, thorium and ores containing these two substances in certain concentrations set by the Commission. ld. § 5(b)(l). In fact, the statutory definition of "fissionable materials" explicitly excluded source materials. ld. § 5(a)(l).
•• Id. § 5(b)(l), (4).
08
S. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946).
•• See supra note 28.
•• NRC regulations require a license for source material only "after removal from its place
of deposit in nature." See 10 C.F.R. § 40.3 (1982). This interpretation of agency regulatory
jurisdiction has been recognized in passing by the federal courts and the NRC. See Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-Continental Explo.ration Co., 282 F.2d 787, 791 (lOth Cir. 1960); In
re Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp., 8 N.R.C. 551, 554 (1978).
11
Pub. L. No. 83-703, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2011-2296 (1982)).
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years of effort on the part of Congress to open the emerging nuclear technology to the private sector. 62 At the same time, the Act
established a comprehensive program of federal licensing and regulation. The Act gave the AEC broad licensing and regulatory authority over the possession, transfer and use of source materials,63
special nuclear materials,64 and byproduct materials. 66 The 1954
Act also empowered the AEC to license construction and operation
of facilities that would produce and use special nuclear material. 66
The statute made no provision for state regulation of byproduct,
source, or special nuclear materials. 67
Under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the federal government be•• By 1954 Congress had recognized that technological advances in both military and
peaceful applications of atomic energy required major changes in the framework of the 1946
legislation. See S. Rep. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3456, 3457-59. The AEC, through the efforts of private industrial contractors, had developed breeder reactors that made nuclear generated electricity feasible for
public consumption. ld. at 3458.
•• The Act defined "source material" as "(1) uranium, thorium or any other material
which is determined by the Commission...to be source material; or (2) ores containing one
or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the Commission may by regulation determine from time to time." The 1954 Act § 11(s) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(z)
(1982)). NRC regulations define source material as "(1) uranium or thorium, or any combination thereof, in physical or chemical form or (2) ores which contain by weight one-twentieth of one percent (0.05%) or more of (i) uranium, (ii) thorium, or (iii) any combination
thereof." 10 C.F.R. § 40.4 (1982). The apparent intention is to extend licensing and regulatory jurisdiction only to mined ore which has reached a milling site for processing into
yellowcake.
84
The Act defines "special nuclear material" as "(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the commission...determines to be special nuclear material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by
any of the foregoing, but does not include source material." The 1954 Act§ 11(0 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1982)).
•• The 1954 Act§§ 51-82 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2114 (1982)). The Act
defines byproduct material as "any radioactive material (except special nuclear material)
yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material." ld. § ll(e) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2014(e) (1982)).
88
ld. §§ 41-44 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2061-64 (1982)).
•• One commentator has noted:
The only conclusion which can be drawn from the 1954 Act in regard to the allocation
of federal and state responsibility for the regulation of source, special nuclear and byproduct materials. . .is that the preoccupation of Congress with the readjustment of
the relation of the federal government and private industry in the development of
atomic energy foreclosed consideration of the possibility of state regulation, other
than traditional regulation of electric power. In ignoring such matters, Congress simply reflected the reality that there was little or no interest in state regulation of this
new federal preserve.
Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 53, at 397-98. See also Cavers, State Responsibility in the
Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 50 Ky. L.J. 29 (1961).
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came actively involved in acquiring source materials. 68 The AEC
encouraged both prospecting for new uranium sources and mining
of uranium when located. It protected a locator's rights to mining
claims, resolved conflicts between miners, conducted its own exploratory drilling, built access roads to lightly prospected areas on
federal lands, withdrew large areas of federal lands from settlement,69 and performed aerial surveys. 70 The AEC's direct purchase
of source material created a boom in uranium production in the
western states. 71
The most important of the government-created incentives for
uranium ore production were financial. The AEC established guaranteed minimum prices for its purchases of uranium ores. 72 Exploration was also subsidized by financial aid from the Defense Minerals Exploration Administration, which granted to qualified
. applicants seventy-five percent of the cost of uranium
exploration. 73
88

From 1948 to 1971, the Atomic Energy Commission purchased 173,665 tons of uranium
concentrate from private suppliers. 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra
note 4, at 72 (Table A-2). The price paid by the AEC has varied considerably, from $12.35
per pound in 1953, to $5.54 per pound in 1971. /d. Direct annual purchases of uranium
concentrate by the AEC peaked at slightly more than 17,600 tons in 1961 and dropped to
4,010 tons in 1970. /d.
•• For instance, between 1948 and 1954 the Atomic Energy Commission stimulated the
discovery and production of uranium by withdrawing from settlement 982 square miles of
public land in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. See Palmer, Problems Arising
out of Public Land Withdrawals of the Atomic Energy Commission, 2 Rocky Mtn. Min. L.
Inst. 77, 86 (1956).
70
These incentives appear to have succeeded. It was estimated that the number of uranium miners grew from 50 in 1949 to 5000 in 1955. See Tippit, Federal Incentives to Uranium Mining, 27 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 457, 465 (1955).
.
71 One lawyer in Utah during the mid 1950s compared the uranium mining boom in that
state to the nineteenth century silver and gold discoveries in Cripple Creek, Leadville, and
Virginia City. See Melich, Some Interesting Sidelights in the Development of the Uranium
Industry, 27 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 451, 456 · (1955).
•• See Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3, 13 Fed. Reg. 2090 (1948); Domestic Uranium
Circular No. 5, Revised, 16 Fed. Reg. 2333 (1951); see also supra note 68.
71 See Tippit, supra note 70, at 458. Despite the encouragement of Congress, private utilities had little incentive to participate in the nation's atomic energy program, for two reasons. First, producing electricity via nuclear reactors did not prove to be lucrative. The first
civilian nuclear power plant, completed in 1957 by the Westinghouse Company and operated for the federal government at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, produced electricity at ten
times the cost of coal or oil powered generators. P. Pringle & J. Speigelman, The Nuclear
Barons 160-62 (1981). Second, utility companies feared incurring liability in case of a catastrophic reactor accident. No utility wanted to be exposed to the risk of defending the personal injury and property damage claims that might result from core melt-down. See S.
Rep. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess 1-3, reprinted in 1957 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1803,
1803-05.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy conducted hearings in the spring of 1956 and
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C. 1959 Amendments to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act
Following the enactment of the 1954 Act, the states demonstrated an interest in regulating and licensing the atomic energy
industry. Protection of the public health and safety from perceived
radiation hazards fell within the traditional domain of state police
powers. Many states established advisory commissions on atomic
energy and registration requirements for radiation sources. 74
In 1959, Congress amended the 1954 Act by adding section 274,711
creating the AEC's Agreement State Program. The program was
designed to permit state participation in regulating a limited segment of the nuclear industry, while insuring that this participation
would not conflict with the power of the AEC. Congress intended
to have nuclear material licensed and regulated either by the AEC,
or by state and local government, but not by both. 76
Under the Agreement State Program, AEC was authorized to
enter into agreements with states to relinquish, rather than delegate, its authority. Thereafter, the agreement state would assume
full regulatory authority over uranium mining and milling,77 source
materials, byproduct materials, and special nuclear materials (collectively called "agreement materials"), as long as these materials
were in quantities insufficient to form a critical mass. 78 Thus, secdetermined that "the problem of liability has become a major roadblock." I d. at 1803. In the
summer of 1956, the Atomic Energy Commission was directed by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy to prepare a study on the possible consequences of a total core melt-down.
The "worst case scenario" predicted property damage approaching $7 billion in 1956 dollars.
Id. at 1803-04.
In an effort to ensure the participation of private utilities in the nuclear energy program,
and to provide' protection to persons who might be injured in a catastrophic reactor accident, Congress enacted an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, the Price-Anderson Act,
Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1982)). This amendment placed a ceiling on the liability of a utility for the damages caused
by a single nuclear accident.
" See Frampton, supra note 47, at 29-40. ·
70
Act of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 42
u.s.c. § 2021 (1982)).
78
S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Seas. 8-9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2878-2880 (comments by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy).
77
42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982). It must be recalled that under the AEC's interpretation of
its jurisdiction, all states. possessed the authority to regulate the mining of uranium ore. See
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
78
Id. § 2021(b),(c). The first state to enter into an agreement with the Atomic Energy
Commission was Kentucky, on March 26, 1962. California became the second agreement
state on September 1, 1962. For effective dates of agreement of all agreement states, see
National Governors' Association Committee on Energy and Environment, The Agreement
State Program: A State Perspective B-1 (January 1983) [hereinafter cited as Governors'
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tion 27 4 offered agreement states a large degree of independence
free from significant federal oversight. 79
Participation in the Agreement State Program entails two steps.
First, the state governor must certify that the state is willing to
assume regulation of nuclear materials, and that the state "has a
program for the control of radiation hazards adequate to protect
the public health and safety."80 This certification must be accompanied by state enabling legislation authorizing the governor to
enter into an agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC). 81 Second, the NRC must determine that the state's radiation safety program is in accordance with the requirements of subsection (o) of section 2021, is adequate to protect the public health
and safety, and is "coordinated and compatible" with the AEC's
regulatory program. 82 The drafters of section· 274 believed that this
terminology would lessen "the dangers of conflicting, overlapping,
and inconsistent standards in different jurisdictions, to the hindrance of industry and jeopardy of public safety."83
The Atomic Energy Commission retained jurisdiction over certain activities which Congress believed were too hazardous to be
Report).
•• It is ironic that the Atomic Energy Act granted the states wide latitude with regard to
source material recovery, yet attempted to centralize control of nuclear power plant licensing in the federal government. Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has
rejected the notion of absolute federal preemption of nuclear power plant licensing. See
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713
(1983) (upholding the state interest in regulating or temporarily excluding nuclear power
plants) .
•• 42 u.s.c. § 2021(d)(1) (1982).
•• In 1974, Congress divided the AEC into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, responsible for regulatory activities, and the Energy Research and Development Administration,
with authority over promotional activities.
81 I d. § 2021(d)(2) & (g). The original regulations implementing the agreement states program, published in 1961, required state standards governing radiation exposure levels to be
uniform with the corresponding federal standards. 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). The NRC no
longer requires that the states' programs be identical to that of the federal agency:
ldenticality, while theoretically possible, can never be achieved because of variations
in interpretation and enforcement. The advisory committee members agreed that
identicality was not only impossible but also ill-advised. States must retain the capability to respond to local or changing circumstances. As another committee member
noted, rigid rules may also stymie innovation.
Governors' Report, supra note 78, at 39.
•• S. Rep. No. 870, supra note 76, at 8-9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2879. The AEC regulations implementing the Agreement State Program indicated that
state radiation protection standards must be uniform with those issued by the Commission.
See 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961).

98

Virginia Journal of Natural Resources Law

[Vol. 4:81

exempted from the Commission's exclusive control. 8 " These activities include the construction and operation of reactors, the import
and export of reactors, the sea disposal of nuclear waste, and the
disposal of any nuclear material which the AEC determines to be
hazardous. 811 Under the 1959 Amendments, the Commission also
retained the authority to license the sale and distribution of any
item containing source, byproduct, or special nuclear material, notwithstanding an agreement with the state.
The Amendments provided that if the AEC determined that a
state was not adequately protecting the public from radiation, the
Commission could reacquire authority over the licensing or regulation of nuclear material by terminating or suspending its agreement with the state. 86 In 1980, the Atomic Energy Act was
amended to permit the NRC to temporarily suspend all or part of
an agreement without notice or hearing, and reassert temporary
control over matters previously within its exclusive jurisdiction
when an emergency exists and the state has not promptly and effectively eliminated the danger. 87 Taken together, these two provisions accord the NRC the ultimate discretion to temporarily or
permanently supplant state regulation of agreement materials.
D.

The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978

Throughout the 1960s there was virtually no federal or state regulation of the disposal of uranium mill tailings. 88 The sufficiency of
ld. at 10, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2880-81.
•• 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1982).
•• ld. § 2021(j)(1). The drafters of section 274 clearly intended that this reserved power
be exercised only in the most extreme circumstances. S. Rep. No. 870, supra note 76, at 12,
reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2882.
•• Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295, title II, § 205, 94 Stat. 287 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2021(j)(2) (1982)). This section was intended to give the NRC additional flexibility
in dealing with emergencies on an expedited basis. The conference report noted, "[t]he conferees recognized that in those rare instances in which an emergency requires NRC to exercise authority the current statutory mechanism is too cumbersome and slow to protect public health and safety." H.R. Rep. No. 1070, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1980).
•• The House report on H.R. 13650, which would become the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, noted:
From the early 1940's through the early 1970's there was little official recognition of
the hazards presented by these tailings. Federal regulation of the industry was minimal. As a consequence, mill tailings were left at sites, mostly in the Southwest, in an
unstabilized and unprotected condition. Some of these tailings were used for construction purposes in the foundations and walls of private and public buildings.
There, through the concentrated emission of radon gas, the hazard of tailings and
public exposure increased substantially.
H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
84
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the agreement states' supervision of uranium mining and milling
activities came into question during the 1970s, when a number of
serious environmental problems arose, involving the operation of
uranium production facilities. After an unusual legislative process,89 Congress enacted the Uranium Mill Tailings Act of 197890 in
response to the deficiencies of the Agreement State Program in
dealing with these problems.
Title I of the Act created "a program of assessment and remedial
action at [inactive] sites... in order to stabilize and control such
tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner and to minimize or eliminate radiation health hazards to the public."91 Title II
established "a program to regulate mill tailings during uranium or
thorium ore processing at active mill operations and after termination of such operations."92 This title significantly changed the federal power to regulate uranium mill tailings, and restructured the
Agreement State Program. 93
Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Act produced four major
changes in federal regulation of uranium mining and milling. First,
by extending the definition of "byproduct material" to include
"the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration
of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its
source material content,"9" Congress extended the NRC's authority
to the regulation of wastes produced with source material. 911 The

7433, 7434; see also id. at 26-28 (documenting lack of concern and minimal early federal
role).
•• The Committee action on proposals dealing with the uranium mill tailings was shared
in the House by the Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs and the Subcommittee
on Energy and Power of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The result of
this committee action was H. R. Rep. No. 1480, Pts. 1 and 2, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
Oddly enough, there were no Senate committee reports on this legislation or similar legislation and there was no conference report. The Uranium Mill Tailings Act was passed during
the final moments of the 95th Congress and this hurried consideration evidently resulted in
numerous errors in drafting. See Grammer, supra note 24, at 480.
00
Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978) (codified as amended at Title 42 (1982)).
01
42 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1) (1982). The statute identified twenty-two abandoned sites in
need of remedial action. I d. § 7912(a)(l). EPA issued regulations for inactive site cleanup in
1980, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 190.10-.21 (1982), and proposed tailings disposal standards in 1981,
see 46 Fed. Reg. 2893 (1981). Final rules were issued in 1983.
.. 42
§ 7901(b)(2).
•• The Act also contains a Title III, which requires the NRC to study active uranium mill
sites in New Mexico to determine whether further remedial steps are necessary.ld. §§ 794142.
.. ld. § 2014(e).
•• ld. § 2111; see also Note, The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Act of 1978, 8 Ecology
L.Q. 801 (1980).
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NRC was instructed to insure the management of uranium mill
tailings in a manner it deemed "appropriate to protect the public
health and safety and the environment from radiological and
nonradiological hazards associated with the processing and with
the possession and transfer of such material. " 96
Second, the 1978 Act required the NRC to develop decontamination, decommissioning and reclamation standards to be imposed
upon mill licensees during the operation of the mill. 97 The Act also
required that the land used for mill tailings disposal, as well as the
tailings themselves, be transferred to the United States or the state
in which the land is located. 98 The legislation empowered the NRC
to require the governmental entity to "undertake such monitoring,
maintenance, and emergency measures as are necessary to protect
the public health and safety."99 The burden of responsibility over
long term maintenance could be a major consideration in a state's
determination of whether to accept custody of tailings sites. The
Act also required "an adequate bond, surety, or other financial arrangement" be provided by the uranium mill licensee "to permit
the completion of all requirements established by the Commission
for the decontamination, decommissioning, and reclamation of
sites, structures, and equipment used in conjunction with byproduct material." 100 The provision does not preclude state and local governments from establishing independent bonding
requirements.
Third, the Act established a cooperative relationship between
the NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding the promulgation and enforcement of environmental standards
regulating uranium mill tailings at both inactive and active tailings
sites. EPA was commanded to propose and, within eleven months
thereafter, to promulgate standards "for the protection of the public health, safety, and the environment from radiological and
nonradiological hazards associated with the processing and with
the possession, transfer, and the disposal of byproduct material."101 EPA's role is to set standards, not to enforce them. The
" 42 U.S.C. § 2114(a)(1).
17 ld. § 2113(a)(1).
18 ld. § 2113(b)(1)(A).
88 Jd. § 2113(b)(5).
100
Jd. § 2201(x)(1).
101
ld. § 2022(b)(1). Unfortunately, these EPA rules were not established within the 11month time frame set up by the Uranium Mill Tailings Act. The EPA rules were finally
proposed on April 29, 1983, nearly three years later than the statute required. In May 1983,
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statute clearly allocates the responsibility for implementing and
enforcing the EPA standards to the NRC and to those agreement
states that assume control over uranium milling operations. 102
Fourth, the 1978 Uranium Mill Tailings Act amended the 1959
Act to permit agreement states to regulate not only the source
materials, but also the tailings produced by the uranium milling
process. 103 An agreement state must comply with the requirements
of the statute regarding the ownership of mill tailings and mill tailings disposal sites. The state must also adopt standards "for the
protection of the public health, safety, and the environment, from
hazards associated with [uranium mill tailings] which are
equivalent to, to the extent practicable, or more stringent than,
standards adopted and enforced by the [NRC]."10" The ability to
regulate uranium milling with standards that exceed federal minima makes agreement affiliation more attractive to a state concerned about the leniency of federal standards.
The Act established certain administrative procedures.for li<;ensing and rulemaking with which agreement states licensing uranium
milling operations must comply.. When a mill license is sought,
state law must provide an opportunity for written comments, a
public hearing, and a written determination subject to judicial review.10G In addition, the state must prepare a written analysis of
environmental effects for "each license which has a significant impact on the human environment," that must be available to the
general public prior to the licensing hearing! 08 The state must provide for public participation in rulemaking through either a public
hearing or the submission of written comments and for judicial re~
view of any rules. 107 In this manner, Congress sought to ensure that
the mill licensing ·activities and the administrative practices of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a proposed suspension of selected pQrtions. of its
own mill licensing regulations, located at 10 C.F.R. pt. 40 (1982), once the EPA-proposed
general environmental standards became final. 48 Fed. Reg. 23,649 (1983). On August 4,
1983, this proposed suspension of NRC rules became final with only two changes. 48 Fed.
Reg. 35,350 (1983).
101
42
§ 2022(d).
108
Id. § 2022(b)(l).
104
I d. § 2021(o)(2). The 1983 NRC Appropriations Act amended the Tailings Act to permit uranium mill licensees to "take into account local or regional conditions, including geology, topography, hydrology and meteorology" in proposing mill tailing disposal methods alternative to those required by the NRC. Pub. L. No. 97-415, § 20, 96 Stat. 2067, 2079 (1983)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2114(c) (1982)).
100
42 U.S.C. § 2021(o)(3)(A).
,.. Id. § 2021(o)(3)(C).
101
Jd. § 2021(o)(3)(B).
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agreement states would be open to public scrutiny and criticism.
III.

A.

STATE PARTICIPATION IN REGULATING THE URANIUM MINING
AND MILLING INDUSTRY

The Agreement State Program: Costs and Benefits

Despite its complete regulatory control over the licensing of uranium mills, the NRC has never asserted jurisdiction over uranium
ore mining. States have retained control over uranium mining as
an aspect of their regulation of conventional mining activities. The
Agreement State Program provides a means of consolidating regulation over the two activities. Combining the power relinquished by
the NRC over uranium milling with traditional state regulation of
uranium mining, a comprehensive scheme of state regulation can
be achieved. By 1983, twenty-six states had elected through the
Agreement State Program to assume some facet of the NRC's regulatory authority. 108 Agreement states now issue nearly sixty percent of all the radioactive materials licenses granted in the United
States. 109
Domestic uranium production has been limited almost exclusively to the western states of New Mexico, Wyoming, and
Texas. 110 In 1983, sixty-six percent of the uranium mined in the
United States was removed from the Colorado Plateau and the
Wyoming Basins. 111 Yet, states with no uranium production industry have adopted regulatory policies concerning the industry.
States have adopted four basic approaches to regulating uranium
mining and milling. Four of the most productive states - Texas,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Washington- regulate uranium milling under agreement with the NRC. 112 These states comprehensively license and regulate both uranium mining and milling. One
non-agreement state, Wyoming, licenses uranium mining and regu108
The agreement states are: Kentucky, California, Mississippi, New York, Texas, Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Kansas, Oregon, Tennessee, New Hampshire, Alabama, Nebraska, Washington, Arizona, Louisiana, Colorado, Idaho, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Georgia, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. The agreement states with
uranium mill regulations are New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Oregon, Washington and
Califronia. Governors' Report, supra note 78, at B-1.
108
/d. at 10.
110
1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 8-9 (Tables 1-7 and I-

S).
111
111

/d. at 9 (Table 1-9).

Three agreement states, Arizona, Idaho, and Nebraska, have returned their uranium
mill licensing authority to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id. at 31 n.13.
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lates a number of nonradiological aspects of uranium milling. Another non-agreement state, Utah, regulates the mining of uranium
ore but not milling.us Finally, at least four states (Vermont, New
Jersey, New York and Minnesota) have discouraged uranium production altogether by adopting restrictive legislation.
Before discussing the technical requirements for becoming an
agreement state, it is worth noting the major arguments for and
against participation in the program. First, agreement state status
is desirable to a state that wishes to maximize its control over this
potentially hazardous industry. The agreement state program permits the state to unify its regulation of radioactive materials in one
agency and thereby undertake a comprehensive regulatory approach toward related public health and safety matters. The agreement states are thought to be more responsive to local conditions
and the needs of their citizens, and therefore are better able to
provide monitoring and inspection services than would be the federal government. Since the agreement state has taken direct responsibility over enumerated radiological materials, it can identify
emergency situations more quickly and respond to them more effectively. Second, while agreement state status does not make that
state eligible for federal financial assistance, it does allow state employees to receive NRC training in specialized areas of radiological
protection. This training can develop highly competent state personnel to implement the agreement program. Third, an agreement
state can consolidate an industry's radiological and nonradiological
permitting requirements into one streamlined permit process, saving both the applicants and the state substantial time and money.
The cost is the primary disadvantage of becoming an agreement
state. The cost of an agreement state's radiation control program
varies with the extent of the functions assumed by the state and
the size and complexity of the responsible state agency. A state
may embark on a limited or a comprehensive agreement program.
Agreement states regulating uranium milling have extensive programs. The cost of administering an agreement program can range
from $100,000 to over $3 million per year. 114 Despite the costliness
m Utah has commenced negotiations with the NRC regarding agreement status, yet does
not wish to regulate uranium mill licensing. See 49 Fed. Reg. 978 (1984).
"' More than half of the twenty-six agreement states spend between $100,000 and
$500,000 per year on their programs. Four agreement states allocate from $500,000 to $1
million per year, while two states grant between $1 million and $3 million per year. One
state spends more than $3 million per year while no state spends less than $100,000. Governors' Report, supra note 78, at 29 (Table 10).
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of implementing the Agreement State Program, the number of
agreement states has increased. The NRC has reported that four
more states - Iowa, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Utah - are currently discussing the possibility of agreement state status with the
NRC. m This indication of interest reflects efforts by the federal
government to encourage agreement status. It also demonstrates
the willingness of the states to expand their own regulatory agencies. It should be noted, however, that none of these four states is
seeking to regulate uranium milling and mill tailings.
B. . NRC Regulations Governing the Agreement State Program

The Agreement State Program technically requires the NRC to
relinquish certain areas of its authority after the NRC and a participating state have reached formal agreement on the state's regulatory program. In practice, a section 274 agreement is arrived at
only after lengthy negotiation between the state and the federal
government. A state wishing to regulate uranium milling operations, low level waste material or permanent disposal facilities
must become an agreement state. Once a state has entered the
Agreement State Program, it may decrease its range of authority
or it may leave the program altogether. 1111 The NRC has established a set of general criteria for states wishing to become agreement states. In 1981, additional criteria were added for states wishing to regulate uranium milling and tailings in order to conform
with the requirements of the 1978 Uranium Mill Tailings Act.
1.

General Criteria for Agreement State Approval

The state regulatory program must include standards for protection against radiation. To achieve uniformity among states concerning maximum permissible radiation levels, the state regulations must be based on the NRC's standards governing maximum
permissible radiation levels and radioactivity concentrations.t 17
Id. at 7 n.l.
The NRC encourages a state to regulate as many of the agreement materials as possible in order to limit the total accumulated occupational radiation exposure to individuals. 46
Fed. Reg. 7540 (1981). The agency makes clear, however, that a comprehensive program "is
not...a necessary or appropriate subject for coverage in the criteria." Id. at 7540-41. Recently, three agreement states, Arizona, Idaho and Nebraska, have relinquished regulatory
authority over uranium mill tailings to the NRC. Governors' Report, supra note 78, at 31
n.13.
117
46 Fed. Reg. 7450, 7541 (1981) (criterion 3). These standards are set out in 10 C.F.R.
pt. 20 (1983). This section of the NRC regulations creates rules regarding permissible doses,
110

118
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These standards govern the waste disposal into air, waters, sewers
and soil. The state must also require licensees to maintain radiation exposure records, report accidents, and notify employees of
excessive radiation exposure. 118 The state regulatory authority
must monitor the radiation exposure of personnel and conduct inspections of all licensed facilities; 119 the criteria do not explicitly
stipulate the frequency of inspection. 120
The general criteria set forth the minimum training required of
regulatory and inspection personnel. The NRC recommends that
personnel who perform evaluation and inspection functions hold a
bachelor's degree or equivalent in the physical and/or life sciences,
including biology, chemistry, physics, and engineering and have
training and experience in radiation protection.m The general criteria do not establish specific levels of staffing in the agreement
states' regulatory agencies; the level of staffing is apparently determined through negotiation between the agreement state and the
NRC over a period of time. 122
The NRC criteria conclude with an admonition that "[s]tate
practices for assuring the fair and impartial administration of regulatory law, including provision for public participation where appropriate, should be incorporated in procedures" for rulemaking,
license evaluation, and enforcement actions. 123 Both the Uranium
Mill Tailings Act and the specific criteria addressing uranium mill
licensing require additional state procedures in these areas. As a
guidance document, the general criteria do not provide much spelevels and concentrations of radiation, precautionary procedures, waste disposal requirements, records and notification requirements and enforcement.
118
46 Fed. Reg. 7450, 7451 (1981) (criterion 11). Criterion 19 does not specifically require
the agreement state to implement any particular enforcement method. It states that the
enforcement system "may include, as appropriate, administrative remedies looking toward
issuance of orders requiring affirmative action or suspension or revocation of the right to
possess and use materials, and the impounding of the materials, the obtaining of injunctive
·
relief, and the imposing of civil or criminal penalties." !d. at 7542.
111
/d. at 7541, 7542 (criteria 5, 16).
••• Criterion 16 states that "frequency of inspection shall be directly related to the
amount and kind of material and type of operation licensed, and it shall be adequate to
ensure compliance." Id. at 7542. This vague standard apparently requires more frequent
inspections of larger or complex facilities.
m /d. The NRC has not clearly established the degree to which an agreement state may
rely upon consultants for monitoring and inspection functions.
111
The sufficiency of agreement state staffing levels may also become a matter of significant conflict after the initial federal/state agreement has been negotiated. The NRC has
criticized states for the level of program staffing during periodic state evaluations and in the
·
amendment of existing agreements.
••• 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7543 (1981).
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cific advice to a state considering affiliation with the Agreement
State Program.
2. Additional Criteria for State Regulation of Uranium Milling
and Mill Tailings

Pursuant to the Uranium Mill Tailings Act of 1978, the NRC
established a number of procedural requirements for rulemaking
and licensing that have special application to states intending to
undertake uranium mill tailings licensing. Most likely, many of
these procedural requirements are provided under existing state
administrative law. 124 If not, legislation must be enacted to ensure
the public participationlrights required by the NRC.m
In addition to procedural requirements for rulemaking and licensing, the NRC requires that an agreement state develop procedures for preparing an environmental impact analysis of a stateissued uranium mill license. 126 The NRC regulations require that
the environmental analysis include, at a minimum, an assessment
of radiological and nonradiological public health impacts, impacts
on surface water and groundwater, alternatives to the licensed activities, and long term impacts of those actions. 127 In practice,
some agreement states have produced environmental analyses covering a broad range of potential impacts beyond those specified in
the NRC regulations. 128
The agreement state must designate a lead agency to prepare the
114

As of 1980, more than half the states had adopted an administrative procedure act
based at least in part on the original or the revised model state administrative procedure
act. See 14 Uniform Laws Annotated 357 (master ed. 1980). Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Mexico and Oregon have adopted comprehensive administrative procedure
legislation not based upon the model act. 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1:10
(2d ed. 1978).
110
46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7543 (1981) (criterion 29).
118
Id. at 7544 (criterion 31).
11
' Id.
118
In Texas, for example, the Texas Bureau of Radiation Control issued an environmental assessment on a conventional uranium mill license application of the Anaconda Minerals
Company in 1982. This assessment covered such subjects as climate, air quality, regional
demography, socio-economics, land use, cultural resources, geology, hydrology, and the ecology of the area. In addition, the proposed operation of the mill and the supporting mines
were analyzed in terms of their non-radioactive and radioactive emissions, stabilization of
tailings, operational monitoring, impact of accidents, impact of operations, alternatives,
financial security, land ownership, and interagency review. See Texas Department of
Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, Environmental Assessment, Safety Evaluation Report,
and Proposed License Conditions Related to Anaconda Minerals Company Rhode Ranch
Project, McMullen County, Texas (August 31, 1982) (Pub. No. TBRC EA-9) [hereinafter
cited as Rhode Ranch Proiect Environmental Assessment].
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environmental analysis for a mill licensing proposal when a number of state and federal agencies have regulatory responsibilities
regarding the proposed project. 129 Since the production of an environmental analysis would seem to require significant expertise, the
agency may employ outside consulting services. 130
The background requirements for personnel regulating uranium
mills are even more stringent than those for the members of the
general regulatory agency. The staffing needed to process uranium
mill applications fall into three separate categories: technical, administrative, and support. 131 The NRC criteria define the functions
of each of these three categories of employees. 132 The NRC has estimated that between two and two and three-quarters total professional person-years of effort are required to process a new conventional uranium mill license or a major renewal in order to satisfy
the requirements of the Uranium Mill Tailings Act. 133 This estimate presumably reflects the manpower necessary to conduct the
required environmental assessment and an in-plant safety review.
A state should consider whether it can attract sufficiently knowledgeable personnel before deciding to join the Agreement State
Program.
Other expenses are not easily measured. The NRC estimates
that various miscellaneous post-licensing activities, including the
issuance of minor license amendments, inspections, and environmental surveillance, would require from one-half to one personyear of effort per licensed facility. 134 This estimate does not appear
to account for the possibility of a major environmental problem
after the uranium mill facility is licensed.
••• 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (criterion 33(b)). This requirement parallels a similar requirement of federal environmental impact statements. The Council on Environmental Quality
regulations describe the designation of a lead agency supervising the preparation of an environmental impact statement if multiple agencies are involved in a project subject to NEPA.
40 C.F.R. § 1501.5 (1982).
130
46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (1981) (criterion 33(d)). The criterion emphasizes, however,
that the consultants employed by the state be selected following a procedure that ensures,
to the maximum extent possible, that they do not have a conflict of interest in the project
they are evaluating. I d. The criterion states that the agreement agency cannot use the applicant's environmental report in lieu of its own independent assessment of the proposed project. ld. (criterion 33(b)). However, the criterion mysteriously states that "the lead agency
may prepare an environmental assessment based upon an applicant's environmental report." Id. (emphasis added).
·
131
/d. at 7545 (criterion 34).
131 /d. (criterion 34(a)).
133 Id .
... Jd.
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The NRC requires that an agreement state, in addition to licensing personnel, have available "both field and laboratory instrumentation sufficient to ensure the licensee's control of materials and to
validate the licensee's measurements." 1311 These instruments must
be available in a state agency or through a commercial contractor.136 The use of outside contractors would be unavoidable in a
state without a pre-existing laboratory facility and with a small
number of mill licensees.
In conclusion, it is difficult to estimate the total manpower necessary to operate a uranium milling and tailings regulatory program. Notably, the existing agreement states appear to have much
larger staffs in their radiological control programs than the minimum required by NRC guidelines. Furthermore, it would seem
that much of the cost associated with such programs would be incurred during the initial stage of licensing a facility. Less staffing
would be necessary to inspect and monitor a facility once it had
been licensed. Therefore, without a continual flow of new facilities,
a state bureaucracy created to perform environmental assessment
and regulatory compliance analysis might find itself with little
work to do.
3.

Authority Retained by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

The NRC has reserved significant authority over uranium milling and tailing regulation in agreement states. The agency requires
that state regulatory programs be "equivalent to the extent practical or more stringent than regulations and standards adopted and
enforced by the Commission, as required by Section 274 (o)." 137
Therefore, the NRC regulations, as augmented by the EPA general
standards, serve as a floor for an agreement state's regulatory
program.
The NRC reserves the power to establish minimum standards
governing reclamation, long-term surveillance and maintenance,
and ownership of byproduct material. 138 In addition, the NRC
reserves the right to determine prior to the termination of a ura••• /d. at 7546 (criterion 36).
/d. (criterion 36(b)).
187
/d. at 7544 (criterion 32). The NRC regulations concerning the Agreement State Program explicitly state that the agreement state's licensing standards must be equivalent to or
more stringent than the NRC standards. 10 C.F.R. pt. 40, Appendix A (1983).
188
46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (1981) (criterion 30(a)); see also 10 C.F.R. § 150.15(a), (b)
(1983).
188
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nium mill license that the licensee has complied with decontamination, decommissioning and reclamation standards and ownership
requirements applicable to the site. 139 Since title to the mill tailings and the tailings disposal site will be transferred either to the
federal government or to the state at its option, 140 the governmental entity having custody would assume responsibility to protect
the public from risks created by a site which has not been properly
decontaminated. The NRC also reserves the authority to require
monitoring, maintenance and emergency measures after the license
is terminated. 141 Finally, the NRC reserves the right to authorize
the use of the surface or subsurface area of a uranium mill or mill
tailings disposal site for other purposes after the closure of the
facility. 142
I

4. Federal Evaluation of Agreement State Radiation Control
Programs

The NRC has issued guidelines concerning its periodic evaluation of established agreement state programs. 143 The guidelines address six major elements of the state radiation and control program: legislation and regulations, organization, management and
administration, personnel, licensing, and compliance. 144 These
guidelines are used by the NRC during on-site reviews of agreement state programs conducted approximately every eighteen
months. During a review, the NRC determines whe.ther the program is adequate to protect the public health and safety and
whether the program is compatible with the NRC regulatory authority.14a If there is a serious deficiency relating directly to public
health or welfare, the NRC requests an immediate response and a
follow-up review is conducted within six months. 148 If the state
program has not improved or if additional deficiencies are detected, the NRC may initiate proceedings to revoke or suspend
part or all of the state's agreement program. 147
100
140

,..
141

...
•••
""
•••
,.,

Id. at 7544 (criterion 30(b)).
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (1981) (criterion 30(d)).
42 U.S.C. § 2113(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1982) .
46 Fed. Reg. 59,341 (1981).
Id.
Id. at 59,342.
Id. at 59,343.
Id.
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C. State Regulation of the Uranium Mining and Milling
Industry
1.

Virginia's Approach to the Uranium Industry
It is common for state legislatures to directly establish policy in

an area of significant state interest by enacting statutes which create prospective regulatory programs and administrative responsibilities. Typically, the legislative branch sets forth general principles of governance and permits the state executive agency to
implement its authority by administrative rulemaking, licensing
and enforcement.
However, the development of the uranium policy in Virginia has
deviated from this model. The General Assembly has authorized
the creation of a series of commissions to collect information on
the nuclear fuels industry and assess the risks associated with establishing a uranium mine-mill complex in Pittsylvania County. In
1982 the state's mining laws were specifically amended to regulate
uranium exploration. This statute empowered the Virginia Division of Mines to grant uranium exploration permits and established specific performance standards applicable to uranium prospecting. The legislature was careful, however, to prohibit uranium
mining until it had established a more elaborate policy. The effect
was to freeze the status quo without recognizing any vested rights
to mine uranium.
In 1983, the legislature created the Uranium Administrative
Group (UAG) to coordinate and evaluate studies of the effects of
uranium mining and to file a report with the Virginia Coal and
Energy Commission by December 1, 1983. The report was to inform the Commission of the results of the studies, and make recommendations for legislation, if appropriate. By 1984, the UAG
was still not prepared to render a definitive judgment on the future
of uranium production in Virginia.
In 1984, the quest for data about the health, safety and economic effects of uranium mining spawned the creation of yet another organization, the Uranium Task Force (UTF). The Task
Force, representing various state agencies and other public interest
representatives, was directed to formally assess the risks posed by
the mining and milling project proposed for the Pittsylvania
County site. The UTF made its final report in October, 1984. 148
"" The information in the remainder of this subsection comes from Uranium Task Force,
Uranium Study Newsletter, Pub. No. 19 (October 1984).

1984]

State Regulation of Uranium Production

111

The information it developed does not address all the questions
that should be addressed prior to final licensing of the Pittsylvania
County facility. However, it does respond to the mandate for developing an improved technical and administrative base in order to
make an informed legislative decision. The Task Force concluded
that uranium development activity can be undertaken with an acceptable level of risk and with economic benefits to the state if and
only if the following recommendations are adopted:
1. Virginia should become an agreement state with the right to
license a uranium production facility.
2. Statewide standards for acceptable levels of radiation exposure should be made more stringent than current federal standards
by regulating all sources and pathways in a single two-part standard of twenty-five millirem per year (mrem/yr) for sources other
than radon and one picocurie per liter (pCi/1) for radon. Together,
these yield a maximum dose of two hundred eighty-five millirem
per year. The proposed state standard accepts a statistical increase
of 28.5 cases of fatal cancer per million from uranium production,
as compared to fifty per million under the federal standard.
3. A uranium mining, milling, and reclamation statute should be
adopted.
4. A non-degradation standard should apply to groundwater
protection.
5. No surface discharge of process water from either the mill or
the tailings facility should be permitted.
6. Those state regulations and performance standards which govern hazardous waste landfills should be specifically applied by statute to uranium development facilities.
7. A schedule of financial guarantees and fines should be developed to assure strict compliance with license and permit conditions, and a strict liability policy for damage should be adopted by
the state for uranium facilities.
·8. The State should adopt an administrative strategy that assigns the Health Department lead responsibility for negotiating an
agreement with the NRC, and the Department of Mines, Minerals,
and Energy lead reponsibility for on-site monitoring..
9. The UTF should prepare an estimate of the budgetary requirements necessary to regulate uranium development in Virginia.
The legislature may or may not adopt these recommendations.
The discussion that follows, examining the regulation of mining
and milling industries in other states, is intended as a point of
comparison.
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2. Regulation of Uranium Mining and Milling in Texas
Texas has recently emerged as a significant producer of uranium
ore. In 1982, it ranked third behind New Mexico and Wyoming
with seventeen percent of domestic production. 149 As of January 1,
1983, eleven uranium oxide production facilities were operating in
the state: the Chevron Resources Panna Maria uranium processing
plant in Hobson, Texas, and ten in situ mining facilities. 1110 As an
NRC agreement state, Texas has undertaken a comprehensive program of uranium mining and milling regulation in which it exerts
maximum regulatory control over the uranium recovery industry.
Texas has long been active in the regulation of radioactive
materials. The Texas Radiation Control Act was enacted in 1961.
Texas became an agreement state with the Atomic Energy Commission on March 1, 1963. 1111 Under this arrangement, Texas was
permitted to control a wide range of uranium-related activities, including one uranium production facility previously licensed by the
AEC. Texas has committed itself to establishing well-staffed state
agencies to oversee the uranium industry. The major regulatory responsibilities for uranium mining and milling are accorded to the
Texas Railroad Commission, Division of Surface Mining and Reclamation, and the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control.

a.

Uranium Exploration and Mine Regulation

The Texas legislature amended preexisting surface mining and
reclamation provisions in 1979 to specifically regulate uranium
mining. 1112 These provisions empower the Texas Railroad Commission to control uranium exploration, 1113 issue surface mining permits/114 approve reclamation plans/ 1111 establish reclamation standards, 1116 create a system of performance bonding, 1117 and enforce its
own permit conditions and regulations. 1118 The Texas statute borrowed heavily from the state's coal surface mining laws. It conta~ns
••• 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 9 (Table 1-8).
••• Id. at 42 (Table VII-2).
••• Governors' Report, supra note 78, at B-1.
101
Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. tit. 4, §§ 131.001-.270 (Vernon 1978 & 1984 Supp.).
••• ld. § 131.034 (Vernon 1978).
,.. Id. § 131.131.
ua Id. § 131.101.
... ld. § 131.102.
107
ld. §§ 131.201-.214.
,.. Id. §§ 131.261-.270.
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a specific procedure for the designation of certain lands as "unsuitable" for uranium mining, triggered by an application to undertake
uranium surface mining. 1119 A recent amendment to this statute enables citizens to petition the Railroad Commission to have an area
set aside as "unsuitable. " 160
The principal means of regulating uranium mining in Texas is
the mining permit. The permitting process contains three desirable
features. First, the Railroad Commission is directed to establish a
procedure for considering combined permit applications for anumber of uranium mines at noncontiguous sites. 161 Second, a uranium
mining permit application must be circulated to state agencies
having an interest in the matter. 162 Third, a uranium surface mining permittee must obtain liability insurance which provides "bodily injury protection and accidental business property damage"
protection, at a level set by the Railroad Commission. 168
The Texas statute also emphasizes site reclamation. The law requires that a reclamation plan accompany each permit application.164 This provision is designed to insure that the mined land is
"restored to the same condition as the land that existed enjoyed
before the mining or some substantially beneficial condition." 1611
This is similar to the provision of Virginia law requiring a reclamation plan of non-coal mine operators; 166 however, the Texas law
deviates from its Virginia counterpart in setting forth a twentypart list of reclamation standards applicable to each permittec. 167
The Texas system of uranium mine licensing is reinforced by a
two-pronged mechanism ensuring compliance with reclamation
standards and permit conditions: performance bonding and en-

ld. §§ 131.035-.041.
ld. § 131.039(a).
111
ld. § 131.137.
111
I d. § 131.139. The Texas statute expressly conditions the granting of a uranium permit
on a finding by the Railroad Commission that the permit would be in compliance with state
and federal law. See id. § 131.140. A permit will be denied if the Texas Water Quality Board
or the Texas Air Control Board inform the Railroad Commission that the proposed mining
operation would cause pollution of water or air in violation of state law. ld. § 131.141(3).
The Railroad Commission may also deny the permit under the general rubric that the permit will "endanger the health and safety of the public." I d. § 131.141(5). Consequently, the
comments and opinions of other state agencies may be extremely important in the permit
application process.
181
Id. § 131.143.
1
. . Id. § 131.101(b)(1)-(7).
110 ld. § 131.102(c).
111 Va. Code § 45.1-182.1 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
••• Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 131.102(b)(1)-(20) (Supp. 1984).
100

100
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forcement actions. After the Railroad Commission approves an applicant's uranium mining permit and reclamation plan it must set
a performance bond at a level sufficient to complete the reclamation project. 188 Although some operators may be accepted as selfinsurers, most must post a surety to secure payment of this performance bond. 189 The Texas statute wisely provides for adjustment of the bond "to reflect changes in the cost of future reclamation of lands mined or to be mined.m 70 At the conclusion of
satisfactory mine site reclamation, the performance bond may be
released following a Commission inspection and evaluation of the
restoration. 171 A public hearing must be conducted if the Commission determines that the bond release is "significant." 172
To ensure compliance with permit conditions and statutory operational requirements, the Texas legislation authorized a wide
range of enforcement measures, including administrative orders
••• Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 131.202 (Vernon 1978). The Texas statute provides
for establishing the amount of the bond at a level "sufficient to ensure the completion of the
reclamation plan if the work had to be performed by third party in event of forfeiture . . . ."
I d. § 131.202(c). The Commission is instructed to set the amount of the bond following the
advice of two independent estimates. Id. § 131.202(b). This procedure allows the applicant
to submit its own estimate of reclamation costs.
181
/d. § 131.203. The Texas statute permits self-bonding by a mine operator when the
operator demonstrates the existence of a suitable agent to receive service of process and a
history of financial solvency and continuous operation. I d. There is no express provision for
changing a self-insurance bond to a secured bond in the event that the financial condition of
the operator changes in the future.
170
Id. § 131.206. This provision allows for a continuous modification of the bond's
amount to reflect the changing costs of reclamation. The modification of the bond amount is
made expressly subject to the procedure established by the statute for the release of the
performance bond. Id. § 131.206(d).
171
Id. § 131.210. The Commission is directed to inspect and evaluate the reclamation
work of the operator to determine whether or not the release of the bond is appropriate.
The statute directs the Commission to consider the degree of difficulty in completing the
remaining reclamation, whether pollution of surface and subsurface water is occurring, the
probability of continuance or future occurrence of pollution, and the estimated cost of abating pollution. Id. § 131.210(d)(1)-(4).
The Texas statute allows "any person or the officer or head of a federal, state, or local
government or agency" to file written objections to the proposed release of a bond placed by
a mining operator. I d. § 131.214(a). The mining operator must publish a notice of the proposed bond release for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper in the locality of the surface
mining and reclamation operation. Id. § 131.209. The statute also provides for the direct
notification by certified mail of the local governmental authority having jurisdiction over the
mine. Id. § 131.213.
171
Id. § 131.214(c). The Railroad Commission is accorded the sole responsibility for determining which applications for bond release are significant enough to justify a public hearing. Once a determination of significance has been made, the Railroad Commission must
hold a public hearing within the locality in which the uranium mining activity was
conducted.
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and notices of violation, 173 civil suits for injunctive relief and civil
penalties/ 74 and criminal prosecutions. 1711 Texas law does not expressly provide for citizens' suits. Therefore, enforcing compliance
with permit conditions and statutory requirements rests in the
hands of those state agencies given regulatory responsibility under
the Texas Surface Mining Act, primarily the Railroad Commission
and the Texas Attorney General.

b.

Regulation of Uranium Milling in Texas

As is true in many states, mining and milling regulation in Texas
are not consolidated in one state agency. Primary jurisdiction over
uranium milling operations has been accorded, under an extensive
radiation control statute/ 76 to the Department of Health, Bureau
of Radiation Control. The Bureau has undertaken an impressive
regulatory program and issued a number of regulations governing
subjects under its jurisdiction. In October 1981 the agency issued
regulations governing the licensing of uranium recovery
facilities. 177
An applicant for a Texas uranium milling license must submit a
formal application and an environmental report to the Division of
Licensing, Registration and Standards of the Bureau of Radiation
Control. The applicant's environmental report must contain the
following: (1) a description of the proposed project, (2) a discussion
of the site characteristics including ecology, geology, topography,
hydrology, meteorology, historical and cultural landmarks, and archaeology, (3) a description of the radiological and non-radiological
impacts of the proposed action including waterway and ground

/d. §§ 131.261-.263. The Railroad Commission is given a range of administrative powers to order the elimination of dangerous conditions or practices likely to cause harm to the
public. /d. § 131.261. The agency is also accorded the power to issue notices of violations to
the mine operator for less serious problems. /d. § 131.262.
174
/d. §§ 31.265-.266, 31.270. The statute grants the Railroad Commission specific authority to initiate civil suits for injunctive relief and to impose civil penalties of up to $5000 for
each day of violation.
••• Id. §§ 131.267-.269. The Texas law establishes criminal penalties for the willful and
knowing violation of a permit condition or for failure to comply with an order issued by the
Railroad Commission. Additional punishment for this behavior is a fine of up to $10,000 or
imprisonment for up to one year or both.
170
Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 4590f (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1984).
177
Texas Dept. of Health, Division of Occupational Health and Radiation Control, Texas
Regulations for Control of Radiation, Part 43 (October 1981). These regulations and the
procedure adopted by Texas for the consideration of uranium mill licenses largely parallel
the rules of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
178
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water impacts and long term effects, (4) a description of environmental effects of accidents, (5) a discussion of tailings disposal and
decommissioning, and (6) mention of site and project alternatives.178 When the application and environmental report are complete, copies are sent to a number of Texas state agencies for review and comment.
After receiving the environmental report, the Division of Environmental Programs of the Bureau of Radiation Control prepares
an environmental assessment of the uranium milling facility, as required under state and federal law. 179 While the draft assessment
is being prepared, another branch of the Division of Radiation
Control, the Financial Analysis Program, conducts a financial investigation of the applicant and reviews the financial surety proposed for the mill site.
The license applicant must submit a closure plan, including an
estimate of closure costs, in conjunction with its environmental report.180 Should the uranium mill license be granted, the applicant
must then post the surety. As with the bonding of uranium mining
activities, the mill surety amount may be adjusted to take account
of changes in the cost of completing site reclamation. 181 Arrangements must be made for the ultimate transfer of the milling site
and tailings material to either the U.S. Government or the state of
Texas. 182 If it is anticipated a uranium milling site will be transferred to state ownership, the licensee must pay a charge of at least
$250,000 into the Radiation and Perpetual Care fund to cover the
cost of long term care and maintenance of the site. 183 The agency's
regulations specify that "the final disposition of tailings or waste
should be such that the need for on-going active maintenance, to
1

Id. § 43.26(a)(1)-(6).
The Texas Radiation Control Act contains a specific procedure for licensing of uranium recovery facilities which requires that the Radiation Control Agency prepare a written
analysis of any licensing proposal that will "have a significant impact on the human environment." Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 4590f, § llA(a) (Vernon 1984 Supp.). The federal provision is
found at 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (criterion 31).
180
Texas Regulations for Control of Radiation, supra note 177, § 43.60(c).
181
I d. § 43.60(e). The regulations provide that the security "shall be adjusted to recognize
any increases or decreases resulting from inflation, changes in engineering plans, activities
performed, and any other conditions affecting costs." ld.
181
Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 4590f, § 6A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984). These land transfer requirements are imposed upon the state of Texas by the terms of the federal Uranium Mill Tailings Act. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
188
The Texas Radiation Control statute makes a special provision for the Radiation and
Perpetual Care Fund. ld § 16.
"

170
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the maximum extent practicable, [is] eliminated." 184
While the environmental assessment and financial analysis are
being performed, the Division of Compliance and Inspection conducts a review of the applicant's proposed facility, equipment, and
operating and emergency procedures. The Division of Radiation
Control has established an extensive set of technical requirements
applicable to the operational features of the proposed uranium
mill. 186 The Division of Compliance and Inspection then makes its
recommendations to the Divison of Licensing, Registration, and
Standards concerning potential problems involving the proposed
uranium mill project, which are incorporated into a safety analysis.
This analysis is combined with the environmental assessment, and
a final document is produced by the Bureau of Radiation Control.

3. Regulation of Uranium Mining and Milling in Wyoming
Seven uranium mills were operating in the state of Wyoming as
of January 1, 1983. 186 In 1982, the state ranked second to New
Mexico with twenty percent of domestic uranium oxide production.187 Wyoming regulates the mining and milling of uranium
. through four state agencies: the Industrial Siting Commission
under the Industrial Development and Siting Act, 188 the Department of Environmental Quality under the Environmental Quality
Act, 189 the State Mine Inspector and Mining Bureau, 190 and the
State Engineer. 191 The Department of Environmental Quality has
been established as the state agency with comprehensive regulatory responsibilities. 192
18
•

Texas Regulations for Control of Radiation, supra note 177, § 43.70(b).
/d. § 43.40(a)-(m). These regulations provide a great deal of guidance for the uranium
mill applicant in the design of the operational features of the facility.
188
1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 42 (Table VII-2).
187
Id. at 9 (Table I-8).
188
Wyoming Industrial Development and Siting Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-12-101 to -121
(1977 & Supp. 1984).
188
Environmental Quality Act of 1973, Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-11-101 to -1104 (1977).
180
Wyo. Stat. §§ 30-2-101 to -607 (1977).
101
Id. §§ 9-1-901 to -908, 41-3-114, and 41-3-301 to -328.
101
The Department is divided into three divisions -air, water and land - which have
independent jurisdiction over the protection of these resources. /d. § 35-11-105. There is no
consolidated permitting among the divisions. Telephone Interview with Gary Beach, Department of Environmental Quality, Land Quality Division (July 20, 1983) [hereinafter cited
as Beach Interview]. DEQ also has an independent Environmental Quality Council which is
. the rulemaking body and hearings board for the DEQ. /d. § 35-11-112. The Council's proceedings must comply with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. /d. § 35-11112(a)(ii) and (0.
180
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a. Exploration Licensing
The Land Quality Division of the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality has an extensive mineral exploration licensing
program, applicable to uranium exploration. A mining firm wishing
to explore for uranium with earth-moving equipment must obtain
an annual exploration permit from the agency. The mining company must submit an application thoroughly describing the proposed exploration activity 193 and must reclaim and restore the land
"as early as practicable so as to prevent unnecessary erosion, sedimentation, and pollution." 194 The mining company must post a
bond covering the "costs which would be incurred by the State in
the event it is necessary for the State to forfeit such bond and accomplish reclamation of the affected area. " 1911 The amount of the
bond is set by the Land Quality Division and the bond is released
or forfeited under the same procedures as for other surface mining
bonds. 196
The Land Quality Division, acting pursuant to statutory authority,197 has also established "completion and restoration" performance standards and bonding requirements for exploration conducted by drilling. 198 The mining company must post a $10,000
bond for exploration in any one area, to be released only after compliance with drill hole capping and restoration regulations has been
certified by the Administrator of the Land Quality Division. 199

.

b. Mining Regulation
To commence mining, an operator must obtain permits from all
three divisions of the Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ), 200 since each of the divisions operates independently in is8

State of Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality, Land Quality Division,
Rules and Regulations, Chapter X, § l(c)(l)-(12) (1983) [hereinafter cited as Wyoming
Land Quality Regulations].
104
I d. § 3(a). The Land Authority Division has issued regulations specifying standards for
the rehabilitation of the areas which incorporate many of the same regulatory requirements
applicable to mining activities. See id. §§ 2(a), (c) (referring to Chapter IV, §§ 2(b), 3(a),
2(d), 3(d)).
"" ld. § 4(a).
188
Id. § 5; see also Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-11-421 to -423 (1977); Wyoming Land Quality Regulations, supra note 193, at Chapter XVI.
"' Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-404 (1977).
188
Wyoming Land Quality Regulations, supra note 193, at Chapter XV.
"" I d. § 4. If the drill hole plugging requirements are not met, the responsible party may
be fined up to $5,000 or jailed for up to 90 days, or both. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-404(j) (1977).
100
See supra note 192.
"
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suing permits. 201 The Land Quality Division of the Wyoming DEQ
is the sub-agency with primary state regulatory authority over
mining. The Wyoming statute creates an unusual double permitting system for mining, licensing both the land and the mine operator. The first regulatory requirement is a permit to mine directed
at the tract of land under consideration for mining. 202 The Wyoming statute enumerates specific items to be addressed in the permit application; 203 the most significant of these requirements is the
submission of a reclamation plan 204 that must be approved by the
DEQ. If written objections are filed to the permit application in a
timely manner, the DEQ must treat the case as a contested matter
under Wyoming administrative law and hold an adjudicative hearing.206 The Wyoming statute provides twelve grounds for denying a
permit206 and clear time limits for the administrative process. 207
The second necessary permit is a license to mine, issued to the
party who will mine on the land for which a mining permit has
been granted. 208 At this point, the DEQ determines the size of the
reclamation bond required for the mining project. 209
The applicant must also obtain permits from the Wyoming State
Engineer. The State Engineer must review the operational plans of
the mine for approval of the water diversion necessary for the project, the impoundmen~ of any waters in connection with operations, including wastewater ponds, and impoundment design. 210 In
situ mining has separate permitting requirements. 211

c. Milling Regulation
The State Engineer is empowered to regulate many of'the same
••• Beach Interview, supra note 192.
••• Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-405 (1977).
••• Id. § 35-11-406.
104
Id. § 35-11-406(b). The statute lists seventeen specific elements of the reclamation
plan. ld. § 35-11-406(b)(i)-(xvii) .
••• ld. § 35-11-406(g).
102
Id. § 35-11-406(h).
••• ld. § 35-11-406(e), (f), (g), (h), (j). The DEQ, Land Quality Division, is given 90 days
for a completeness review of the application. Upon determination of completeness, the DEQ
has 30 days for technical review if no hearing is requested or 60 days if one is. The ultimate
decision on the permit must be issued within 15 days thereafter.
102
Id. § 35-11-410.
102
I d. § 35-11-410(c). The bond must be no less than $10,000 and set at a level to permit
reclamation of the land disturbed during the first year of operation. ld. § 35-11-417(c).
110
Id. § 41-3-114 (diversion of streams), § 41-3-301 (reservoir permits), § 41-3-308 (approval of impoundment designs).
Ill I d. § 35-11-426, -427.
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features of uranium mill tailings disposal as does the NRC. Although Wyoming is technically a non-agreement state, the state
agencies participate extensively with the NRC in controlling the
uranium recovery industry. The State Engineer has a continuing
duty to inspect impoundment structures, 212 and the DEQ must
also monitor compliance with its operational regulations. 213
The uranium mill must obtain Wyoming operating permits. As
with mining, the milling operator must obtain air, land, and water
permits from DEQ and the State Engineer. 214 DEQ's Land Quality
Division regulations reflect the state's belief that it retains the authority to regulate uranium mill tailings. 2111 The precise extent of
this independent state power has never been tested in litigation.
However, the NRC has apparently agreed that the Wyoming Land
Quality Division will be consulted concerning reclamation plans for
the uranium mill and tailings ponds. 216
The unusual relationship between Wyoming and the NRC has
allowed the state to participate in the regulation of the uranium
production industry without becoming a fully accredited agreement state. On the other hand, Wyoming's aggressive posture has
required the funding of state agencies at a level high enough to
permit active supervision of mining and milling operations.
4. Regulation of Uranium Mining and Milling in Utah

Utah is a relatively minor producer of uranium oxide. At present
there are only three conventional uranium mills and one heap
leaching operation in the state. 217 Utah is not an agreement state
and does not regulate uranium milling. Therefore, the Utah regulatory program focuses on uranium mining. The Utah statutory and
administrative structure is an example of limited state regulation
of the uranium mining and milling industry.
The regulation of all mining activities in Utah is governed by the
/d. § 41-3-308. The DEQ also reviews impoundment designs in its permitting process.
/d. § 35-11-109.
"" State regulations apply to uranium milling, because the Engineer's duties extend to
any project requiring water and impoundments and because DEQ regards milling as an aspect of mining.
110
Beach Interview, supra note 192.
110
Telephone interview with Glen Mooney, DEQ, Land Quality Division (July 13, 1983).
117
1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 42 (Table VII-2). The
three conventional uranium mills have a relatively small combined operating capacity ·of
4150 tons of ore per day. /d.
111

118
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Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act. 218 The Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining and the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining have primary jurisdiction over mining activity within the state. The Board establishes rules and regulations for the Division to enforce. The Board
also has the authority to conduct hearings and issue enforcement
orders, 219 while the Division has authority to issue permits. 220 The
Utah statute does not distinguish between exploration and operation of the mine; its definition of "mining operations" encompasses
"the exploration for, development of, or the extraction of a mineral
deposit from its natural occurrences." 221 Under the Reclamation
Act, state approval is necessary for a broad range of mine related
activities including exploration, mining, and such additional actions as "on-site transportation, concentrating, milling, evaporation, and other primary processing."222 This definition of state jurisdiction could conflict with the NRC's reclamation standards for
uranium mills. 223
Before beginning a mining operation, a mine operator must file a
notice of intention with the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. The
Reclamation Act requires that the applicant submit a reclamation
plan with the notice. 224 This statute does not, however, specify the
components of the reclamation plan or the standard of performance to be met by the reclamation activities. 2211
118
Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-8-1 to -23 (1981 & Supp. 1983) .
... ld. § 40-8-6 (1981).
110
The Utah statutes do not explicitly provide for the granting of a permit or a license
but rather require that an applicant for mining operations file a notice of intention with the
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. /d. § 40-8-13(1). If the statutory and administrative requisites are met the Division may allow the mining activity to proceed. /d. § 40-8-13(4).
I l l ld. § 40-8-4(6) .
... ld.
113
Utah law does direct the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining to coordinate its rules, regulations and procedures with those of other agencies. The objective of this requirement is to
"minimize the need for operators and prospective operators to undertake duplicatory, overlapping, or conflicting compliance procedures." /d. § 40-8-5(2) .
••• ld. § 40-8-13(1).
110
Utah statute establishes three objectives for the Mined Land Reclamation program:
(a) to return the land, concurrently with mining or within a reasonable amount of
time thereafter, to a stable, ecological condition compatible with past, present, and
probable future local land uses;
(b) to minimize or prevent present and future on-site or off-site environmental degradation caused by mining operations to the ecologic and hydrologic regimes and to
meet other pertinent state and federal regulations regarding air and water quality
standards and health and safety criteria;
(c) to minimize or prevent future hazards to public safety and welfare.
ld. at§ 4-8-12(a)-(c). These statutory objectives do not require that the land be restored to
the productivity and quality that it had immediately preceding the mining activity. In fact
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The Utah statute requires the mine operator to furnish evidence
of insurance policies or other information indicating that it will be
"financially responsible during the proposed mining operations for
the payment of off-site public liability or property damage claims
for which he may become liable."228 The insurance requirement
stands in addition to the reclamation surety that is statutorily required for the mining operation. 227
The application procedure established by statute requires that
the Oil, Gas and Mining Division tentatively decide on the merits
of the notice of intention. Assuming that the agency recommends
approval, this tentative decision must be published in local newspapers and newspapers of the capital city, and mailed to the local
zoning authority. 228 Any person or agency who wishes to challenge
the decision must file a written protest with the Oil, Gas and Mining Division within thirty days after the date of last publication. 229
If the written objections are timely received, the Board must hold
a hearing 280 and enter its decision within sixty days. 281
After the operator's notice of intention to mine is approved, the
operator must post a surety with the Division in an amount sufficient to cover reclamation costs. 282 Once approved, the notice of
intention becomes a permanent permit to mine unless it is withdrawn for one of several enumerated reasons. 288 The Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining conducts inspections of the mine site and requires an annual progress report from the mine operator.
The Mined Land Reclamation Act specifically requires that the
mining company comply with all other applicable statutes, rules
and regulations. m The statute also directs the Division to cooperate with all local, state and federal agencies. Consequently, before
mining operations begin, a conference is held by the Division and
other state agencies having regulatory authority over the mine, in-

its language presents a rather amorphous standard of restoration .
••• /d. § 40-8-13(1).
••• ld. § 40-8-14; see infra note 232 and accompanying text.
... ld. § 430-8-13(4) .
••• ld .
... ld .
••• ld. § 40-8-8(1).
111
/d. § 40-8-14. The Oil, Gas and Mining Board establishes the amount of the surety for
a mine operator whose notice of intention has been approved. The surety could be provided
by a written contractual agreement, collateral, bond or other form of insured guarantee,
deposited securities, or cash. /d. § 40-8-14(3).
188
/d. § 40-8-16(2)(a)-(c) .
... ld. § 40-8-17(1).
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eluding the Solid and Hazardous Waste Committee, the Air Conservation Committee, and the Water Pollution Committee. 2311 This
conference is designed to determine what state permits, if any, the
project will need and to expedite the permit process.

5. Legislative Responses to Uranium Development in Non- Western States
While the Western states of New Mexico, Wyoming, Texas,
Washington, Colorado, and Utah have dominated the uranium industry, exploration for new sources of uranium ore has recently occurred in many Eastern states. Despite the recent recession in the
nuclear fuels industry, companies are still exploring for new domestic sources of uranium. In 1982, approximately twenty-five percent of all exploratory drilling for uranium resources took place in
Alaska, Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia and Washington. 236 Reacting to this developing interest, several Eastern states
have recently adopted legislation restricting or prohibiting uranium production within their borders.

a. New Jersey
In New Jersey, the legislature acted to ban uranium exploration,
mining and milling within the state for a period of seven years,
until 1988. 237 This action followed the discovery of uranium in a
geological area known as the Redding Prong238 and the adoption of
several township ordinances prohibiting exploration, mining and
milling of uranium. 239 The legislation granted the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection six years in which to prepare a report for the Governor and the legislature analyzing the
dangers associated with uranium mining and milling and including
"recommendations for the prohibition or regulation of these activities upon the expiration of this act." 2" 0 The law established strict
enforcement sanctions for violations of the moratorium. 2 " 1 In addi... Telephone conversation with Thomas Tetting, Engineering Geologist, Utah Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining (July 28, 1983).
110 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 49 (Table VIII-1).
137 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1 J-1 (West Supp. 1984) .
... N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1980, at 26, col. 3.
••• I d. at 26, col. 5.
••• N.J. Rev. Stat. § 13:1 J-5(a) (West Supp. 1984) .
... !d. § 13-1 J-2(b).
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tion, it preserved the right of local governments to regulate or prohibit uranium development. 242
b.

New York

In June 1983, New York enacted a statute which prohibits the
uranium mining by any method within the state for a period of ten
years. 243 Unlike the New Jersey law, which comprehensively prohibits the exploration, mining and milling of uranium, the New
York legislation bans only mining. The statute does not specifically
preclude uranium exploration but could be interpreted to prohibit
such activities. 244
Under the statute, the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation must study the uranium mining issue and submit to
the Governor and the legislature recommendations concerning the
extension of the moratorium. 240 The statute suggests, however, that
the present legislation could be preempted by federal law. 246 The
legal implications of a permanent state-wide ban on uranium mining and milling in New York have not yet been confronted in
litigation.
••• ld. § 13:1 J-4.
••• N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Laws Ann. § 22-1010 to -1070 (McKinney 1984). The New York
legislature grounded its moratorium upon findings that "mining of uranium may pose a
significant danger to public health, safety and welfare" due to (1) the potential contamination and depletion of surface and groundwater, (2) possible impact of radioactive airborne
particulates upon public health and agriculture, (3) non-existence of adequate waste storage
methods for uranium mining, (4) high governmental costs associated with the clean-up of
abandoned mine site, (5) lack of technical and administrative techniques to abate the
ha2ards of uranium mining and (6) the damaging effect of uranium mining upon scenic
qualities and tourism. /d. § 22-1030(1)-(6).
... The statute defines mining as "the extraction or removal of minerals from the ground
or the breaking of the surface soil in order to facilitate or accomplish the extraction or
removal of such minerals for commercial or industrial use; but shall not include excavation
or grading when conducted solely in aid of on-site farming or construction." ld. § 221050(1). This definition is followed by the general prohibition that "no person shall mine for
uranium by any method including, but not limited to, drilling, excavation, and liquid or
chemical extraction." I d. § 22-1070. Although the statute does not seem to address itself to
the commercial exploration of uranium sources, the definition of mining is broad enough to
include active exploration methods.
... L. 1983, c. 384, §4 (June 27, 1983).
••• The notes following this section of the New York Code contain a severability clause
which states that "this act shall be construed so as not to conflict with applicable federal or
state laws, rules or regulations. In the event that a state or federal law, rule or regulation is
held to preempt any clause or section of this act, or in the event that any such clause or
section is held invalid, such clause or section shall be severable and shall not affect the
validity of the remainder of this act." L. 1983, c. 384, §5 (June 27, 1983).
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Vermont

The Vermont legislature enacted a statute in April 1980 which is
quite different from the temporary moratorium and agency study
laws of New York and New Jersey. Rather than prohibiting uranium mining and milling, Vermont adopted a unique procedure requiring the state's General Assembly, by act of legislation, to legislate express prior approval authorizing the local district
environmental commission to consider an application for a uranium processing facility. 247 The effect of the 1980 amendment was
to require formal legislative approval in addition to the pre-existing regional land use permit. The action of the Vermont legislature has apparently deterred potential uranium mining and milling
firms; however, these special approval requirements may be subject
to legal challenge. 248
The statutes enacted in New Jersey, New York and Vermont
clearly do not encourage firms wishing to produce source material.
The legislatures of these states have been persuaded that uranium
production, if not totally unacceptable, at least raises serious
enough environmental and social concern that a long-term evaluation of the industry must be conducted before uranium production
is authorized. The caution with which these three states have approached the issue reflects the uncertain environmental effects of
implementing in an Eastern state mining and processing technology developed in the West.

d. Minnesota
During 1982, mmmg firms undertook exploratory drilling for
uranium ore in Minnesota. 249 The Minnesota legislature has not
yet adopted statutes that specifically address the regulation of the
uranium mining and milling industry. It has, however, enacted a
conventional array of governmental controls that would apply to
uranium mining and milling.
••• Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6083(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Under general Vermont land use
and development law, activities coming within a statutory definition of "development" (including uranium mining and milling) must receive a permit from the regional District Commission. /d. § 6001(3). A uranium development project would have to satisfy an extensive
list of conditions in order to receive a permit from the District Commission. /d. §
6086(a)(1)-(10). The statute clearly notes that approval of the proposal by the General Assembly "shall not be construed as approval of any particular application or proposal for
development." /d.
••• See N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1980, at 20, col. 3.
140
1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 49 (Table VIII-1).
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The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources has responsiblity for granting prospecting permits and mining permits on state
lands. 2110 As part of this licensing process, a reclamation plan must
be filed by the applicant for proposed mines and mills. 2111 A bond
must be posted to ensure performance of the reclamation plan. 2112
The Department of Health has authority over exploratory boring,2118 including the responsibility to inspect sites and license exploratory boring. 2114 The Department of Natural Resources is responsible for permitting the use and diversion of surface and
ground water and inspecting dams. m The Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency conducts the state's water, air, noise, and solid
waste program. As in most states, uranium mines and mills would
be subject to any applicable air and water pollution control
regulations. 2116
Of special importance to the uranium industry is the Minnesota
Radioactive Waste Management Act, which prohibits construction
of a "radioactive waste management facility" without express authorization from the state legislature. 2117 The broad definition of
"radioactive waste" would appear to encompass the disposal of
uranium mill tailings 2118 and would therefore make construction of
a uranium mill dependent on permission from the Minnesota
legislature.
The Environmental Quality Board carries out the provisions of
the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). 2119 This Act requires an environmental impact statement for a project having a
significant environmental impact and a connection to state governmental action. 260 A uranium recovery facility under state permit
authority would be required to comply with MEP A. The Act also

••• Minn. Stat. Ann. § 93.43 (West 1977 & 1982 Supp.).
••• Id. § 93.481.
••• I d. § 93.49 The process of submitting a reclamation plan and posting a bond is similar
to the licensing system in Virginia. See Va. Code §§ 45.1-182.1, -183, -184 (1980).
••• Minn. Stat. Ann. § 156A.01 (West Supp. 1982) (authorization to control, for health
purposes, not only exploratory boring, but also water wells).
••• ld. § 156A.071.
••• ld. §§ 105.37, 105.41, 104.415, 105.417, 105.42, 105.46, 105.47, 105.52.
••• ld. §§ 115, 116.
.., Id. § 116C.72.
••• "Radioactive waste" means "(a) useless or unwanted capturable radioactive residues
produced incidental to the use of radioactive material; or (b) useless or unwanted radioactive material; or (c) otherwise nonradioactive material made radioactive by contamination
with radioactive material." Id. § 116C.71(6).
••• Id. § 1160.04.
••• ld. § 116D.04(2a).
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provides that feasible alternatives should be considered and that
economic considerations alone should not dictate feasibility. 261
This statute also imposes upon state agencies procedural duties
and substantive standards similar to those NEPA imposes on the
federal government, enforceable under state law. 262
In 1981, the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board prepared a
report for the state legislature expressing a number of concerns
about uranium mining and milling. 263 .The report implicitly assumed that new rules governing uranium mining and milling would
need to be adopted, and that the state should take an active role in
regulating the industry. Specifically, the report advised the state to
adopt special reclamation plans for uranium mining facilities, and
to control radon release from the mines. 264 The report also advised
that ambiguous points in the state's environmental regulations,
such as whether the Solid Waste Management Act applies, be clarified before the new industry is authorized. 2611 The report also recommended that Minnesota become an agreement state in order to
assume responsibility for hazards associated with uranium mill
tailings. 266
Minnesota's response to exploratory drilling illustrates a state
with an elaborate system of environmental laws in place - all of
which would apply to uranium mining - which yet wishes to actively control the development of the industry by tailoring laws
specifically to uranium mining.
IV.

CONCLUSION

From this discussion it is clear that different states have approached the uranium production industry in a variety of ways.
Some have considered it an acceptable industry that nonetheless
requires regulation by the federal and state governments, while
others have banned it altogether. Virginia could become the first
••• ld. § 1160.04(6).
••• The obligations imposed by MEPA fall upon state agencies. The state legislature enacted the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act in 1971 to provide a mechanism by which
citizens can enforce the duties established under the Environmental Policy Act and other
state statutes. ld. § 1168.01-.13; see Peer v. Minn. Envir. Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858
(Minn. 1978).
••• Minnesota Environmental Quality Board, Uranium Exploration, Mining and Milling
in Minnesota: A Review of the State's Regulatory Framework (May 1981) .
... ld. at 6, 14-15, 22.
••• Id. at 14, 15, 52-53.
... ld. at 32-35.
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Eastern state to sanction uranium mining and milling within its
borders. Should Virginia choose to accept uranium development, it
will have great flexibility in setting the terms which control the
operation of the new industry. In 1985, the Virginia General Assembly can choose from among at least five potential courses of
action. The ways in which other states have chosen to regulate the
industry reflect a range of positions on the safety of the industry
and the regulatory capabilities of various government agencies.
First, the General Assembly could permanently ban uranium
mining. A permanent ban might be challenged in court by proponents of uranium development on grounds of federal preemption
or obstruction of interstate commerce.
Second, the Assembly could conclude that it does not yet have
sufficient information to make a decision on uranium development
and extend the uranium mining moratorium until such information is available.
Third, the legislature could without enacting specific legislation
simply lift the current prohibition. Uranium exploration and mining would then be regulated by state agencies under the authority
they currently possess. Uranium milling would be regulated by the
NRC. This alternative requires the least initiative and involves the
state government only in oversight of exploration and mining.
Fourth, the Assembly could amend the state's mining laws to
specifically accommodate uranium mining. This would acknowledge that uranium mining creates hazards justifying specific statutory attention. As with the third alternative, the regulation of uranium milling operations would still rest with the NRC.
Fifth, the Assembly could adopt legislation regulating uranium
mining and committing the state to becoming an agreement state
under the NRC program. This would be the most active and costly
level of state involvement in the regulation of the uranium industry, but it offers Virginia maximum possible control over the
industry.
Should the General Assembly adopt this fifth option it should
consider three issues in its legislation: the allocation of regulatory
responsibilities to state agencies, environmental impact review
analysis, and financial liability provisions. The Assembly must decide what kind of institutional organization should regulate the
uranium industry. Should pre-existing or newly created state agencies regulate this new industry? The legislature must consider cost
and institutional capabilities. Next, the legislature must establish
decisionmaking standards to govern the agencies' actions. Such
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standards should constrain agency discretion in licensing uranium
facilities. In addition, the legislature must implement administrative procedures which define the method by which important licensing decisions will be made. The question of public participation must be adequately addressed. Since the issue of uranium
facility licensing is controversial, it is important to insure that the
public is provided with the opportunity to obtain relevant information and to participate in both rulemaking and licensing proceedings. It is especially important that the opinions of those residents
living close to a proposed uranium facility be incorporated into the
decisionmaking process. In addition, the legislature should authorize judicial review of rulemaking and licensing decisions. This
would insure that determinations regarding uranium development
activities are tested by an impartial judicial body. Funding the regulatory system is also a key issue. The legislation should secure
financial support for the regulatory system through the imposition
of severance taxes and/or permit and licensing fees. This policy
would force the regulated industry to bear the expenses of its own
governmental regulation and would assure that funds not be diverted from other state purposes.
Environmental impact review of the uranium production industry is another important issue. The Uranium Mill Tailings Act requires that states regulating uranium mills conduct an environmental review similar to that required by the National
Environmental Policy Act. Should Virginia become an agreement
state, the authorizing legislation would have to consider the necessary administrative agency responsibilities and what actions would
be subject to this environmental analysis. The analysis should be
similar to an environmental impact statement prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The state agency should prepare an
analysis not only of the proposal currently before the legislature
but also of license renewals and any proposals for new mines or
mills. The environmental analysis and review should consider in an
integrated fashion both the mining and milling aspects of uranium
development. The legislation must clearly define the administrative responsibility for environmental impact review. Since a number of state agencies will possess regulatory control over any proposal, it will be necessary to designate a lead agency which will be
responsible for the preparation of the impact statement. The legislation must also establish a process for environmental impact review including timetables, comment periods, publication requirements, and public hearing rights.
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The financial liability of uranium mining and milling facility operators is a final significant issue. Any uranium development permitted in Virginia would be required to conform to stringent design, operation and closure requirements. The authorizing
legislation should provide for financial liability for those operators
who fail to meet these requirements. The statute should require
that an operator of a uranium mine or mill post a sufficient performance bond to insure that all required operation and closure
activities are performed. The legislation should also create liability
for property damage, personal injury, and remedial action associated with the operation of the facility, tied to a liability standard
based on negligence, modified strict liability, or true strict liability.
The liability could be unlimited or confined by a statutory maximum. The statute should also allocate burdens of proof in any action arising under the liability provisions. The inclusion of a liability provision may be important in obtaining approval of the
authorizing legislation and would serve as a backstop should injuries occur in spite of the best governmental efforts at regulating
the industry.
The uranium mining issue presents Virginia with the task of establishing policy on a matter requiring a careful balancing of public health and safety risks against potential economic benefits.
Whatever the resolution of the issue, the success or failure of the
ultimate policy choice will not be immediately known. Regulatory
choices made today will be tested over the indefinite future. Due to
the uncertainty inherent in this decision, Virginia's legislators find
themselves confronting difficult policy decisions.
In an area of uncertainty, with significant public health risks, it
is critically important to secure accurate information to aid in selecting the best policy alternative. It is also necessary in developing
a controversial state policy to include a wide spectrum of views in
the decisionmaking process. The meaningful participation of public interest organizations, individuals, and local governments
should be encouraged. Regulation of a new industry calls for an
accurate estimation of the regulatory capabilities of relevant governmental agencies; an honest appraisal of these capabilities is
necessary to establish a framework of regulatory responsibility.
These concerns should govern the Assembly in adopting its policy on the uranium production issue. Decisions made today will
have important effects not only tomorrow but for many years
thereafter.

